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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES court in following them, as they were directly opposed to the conclusions reached in all the cases in which the business of trading stamp companies has been under investigation. CONTRACTS. (Of Marriage.) Cal. — In Bailey v. Brown, 88 Pac. Rep. 518, an ingenious contract of marriage was entered into, presum ably to avoid any disagreeable interference by the mother-in-law with the conjugal bliss of the wedded pair. The question arises on an issue of variance between the plaintiff's allegation and the proof. Plaintiff alleged that defendant promised to marry her on her request at any time and the proof was that the marriage was not to occur until her mother's death. There was an essential difference between the allegation and "the proof. The court cited Owen v. Meade, 104 Cal. 179, 37 Pac. Rep. 923; Shenandoah M. Co. v. Morgan, 106 Cal. 409, 417, 39 Pac. Rep. 802, and Davis v. Pacific Tel. Co., 127 Cal. 317, 321, 59, Pac. Rep. 698, and held that the defendant was entitled to a nonsuit on the ground of variance. Judge McLaughlin, in a concurring opinion, stated that the evidence clearly demonstrated that the plain tiff could not recover, even if a complaint con tained the most elaborate averments in conso nance with the proof. He asked the question, "How could a contract to marry exist when the promisor might never be under an obligation to marry the promisee, and vice versa " and con tinues, " If this good mother should live to a very ripe old age, as mothers sometimes do, no human could tell what might happen. Either of the parties might be waiting for the other, harp in hand, beyond this vale of tears, or both might pine away and die before this promise of future connubial bliss could ripen into a cause of action enforceable in earthly courts. Then, too, age creeps on all apace, and, if the contingency which could make this promise quick with life as a legal obligation, performable presently, was delayed through many weary years, waning desire and ripened judgment might prompt the parties to acknowledge the wisdom of that rule of public policy which forbids long-continued restraint upon marriage, and frowns upon a contract tan tamount to an indefinite postponement thereof. And, if the roseate dreams of youth survived the blasting frosts of age, decrepitude, mental or physical incapacity, infirmities due to weight of years might be urged as defenses not now avail able to this defendant." HUSBAND AND WIFE. (Enticing away wife.) Mass. — Interesting from a legal stand point is the recent case of Mutter v. Knibbs, 79 N. E. Rep. 762, which was an action by a husband against his wife's father for enticing away and

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keeping from him his wife. The case practically turned on the distinction between the rights of the father or parents of a wife and a stranger to induce the wife to leave her husband. The court in discussing this distinction said in part: " There is a material difference between the acts of a parent and those of a mere intermeddler. Even in the latter case a defendant may disprove any intent on his part in advising the wife to cause a separation and may show that his advice was honestly given. But the rights and the corre sponding duties of a parent are much greater than those of a stranger; and much stronger evidence is required to maintain an action against him. It is proper for him to give to his daughter such advice and to bring such motives of persuasion of inducement to bear upon her as he fairly and honestly considers to be called for by her best interests; and he is not liable to her husband in damages for her desertion, resulting therefrom, unless he has been actuated by malice or ill-will towards the plaintiff and not by a proper parental regard for the welfare and happiness of his child. In such an action the material question is the intent with which the parent acted rather than the wisdom or even the justice of the course which he took." INSURANCE. (Accident Insurance — Excep tions in policy.) Wis. — A somewhat peculiar state of facts is found in Weidner v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company of Detroit, Michigan, 110 N. W. Rep. 246, which was an action on an accident policy limiting the loss to one-tenth of the amount otherwise payable, in event of death due to injuries intentionally inflicted upon insured by any other person, except assaults committed for the sole purpose of robbery. Insured was riding in a wagon with other persons and as they approached a toll gate they met two men, one of whom asked for a ride and exhibited a ticket. One of the persons in the wagon returned the ticket as the driver did not desire to give them a ride, whereupon the other man took from the wagon a pair of rubber boots belonging to insured and started off with them. Insured then demanded his boots and the man having possession of them struck him, knocking him down, and then beat insured in the face with the boots, inflicting injuries from which he afterwards died. The lower court granted a nonsuit on the ground that the evidence showed that a dispute and a controversy had arisen between the parties upon the 'road and, that the sole purpose of that assault was not robbery. The appellate court in reversing this holding decided that such facts presented a question of fact to be passed upon by the jury and cited