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 THE GREEN BAG the Constitution. The decision turns on the con stitutionality of Act, June n, 1906, 34 St. 232, c. 3073, which makes common carriers liable to any smployee for all damages which may result from the negligence of any of its officers, agents or employees, or by reason of any defect due to its negligence in its cars, road bed, or works. It was contended that the relation between common carriers and their employees, more or less affected interstate commerce and for that reason it was within the power of Congress to regulate it. In answer to this contention Williams v. Fears, 197 U. S. 278, 21 Sup. Ct. 131, 45 L. Ed. 186 was quoted in the language of Chief Justice Fuller, to the effect, that if the power to regulate interstate commerce applied to all the incidents to which said commerce might give rise and to all con tracts which might be made in the course of its transaction, that power would embrace the entire sphere of mercantile activity in any way con nected with trade between the states and would exclude state control over many contracts purely domestic in their nature. It was urged in argu ment that the Safety Appliance Act (Act, March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 St. 531), U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174, and the act in question were the same in character, and it was insisted that if the former was within the power of Congress to enact, it must have been within its power to enact the latter. The court found a well-defined distinc tion between these two acts. That distinction was clearly pointed out by showing .that the carrier's liability under the Safety Appliance Act was in the nature of a penalty because of the carrier's violating the rules of the government prescribed by Congress for the conduct of its business and because as a result of such violation the employee was injured. In the act in question Congress did not undertake to prescribe a rule or regulation for the conduct of the business of a common carrier for the infraction of which any penalty was imposed, but the act only declared that the carrier should be liable for all damages to its employees, the result of negligence of its officers or agents. The court concludes that the power of Congress to define the liability of com mon carriers, engaged in interstate commerce to their employees, and to create rights of action in favor of employees, and to define the method of procedure, can only be exercised when Congress in the first instance has prescribed rules of con duct governing common carriers, and it is only for the breach of these rules that Congress has power to prescribe civil liability. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Initiative Legisla tion.) Cal. — A recent case of great interest and touching on a great question is found in In ri

Pfahler, 88 Pac. Rep. 270, which called in ques tion the validity of .an " initiative " provision of the Los Angeles City Charter. Though the case presents too many phases of interest to permit of delving deeply, it will not be amiss to skim it. The main contention of course was the validity of the provision under the Federal Constitution, which guarantees a republican form of govern ment. The court in upholding the provision of the charter based its decision mainly on thegrounds that if the constitutional provision did refer to states it did not refer to local affairs in that state. It was also urged that the provisions, interfered with and suspended the exercise of the police power, and other state constitutional pro visions, all of which were considered as not affect ing the validity of the law. There was, however, a dissenting opinion in the case based on the ground that the " initiative " provision in the charter did offend the constitutional provision providing for a republican form of government, and that such constitutional provision 'did apply to local government in the state, and arguing that the guaranty necessarily imposes a duty on the part of the states themselves to provide such a government, and hence every act done by a state inconsistent with and violative of the theory of the republican form of government is invalid. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Trading Stamps.) Colo. — Another case on the much discussed ques tion of trading stamps and one already passed upon by several able courts is found in City and County of Denver v. Frueauff, 88 Pac. Rep. 389, where the validity of an ordinance was called in question forbidding any gift enterprise designed to include the giving of any trading stamps or other device which shall entitle the purchaser of property to receive from any person or corpora tion other than the vendor any property other than that actually sold. The trading stamp con tract was the ordinary one for the giving of stamps to purchasers of goods as a medium of advertising. The constitutional provision which it was contended that this contract offended pro vided, " the general assembly shall have no power to authorize lotteries or gift enterprises for any purpose and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets in this state. The court cites and bases its decision that the ordi nance in question was not a valid exercise of police power and that such giving of trading stamps was not a gift enterprise on two cases; that of Young v. Commonwealth, 45 S. E. 327, and State v. Dalton, 22 R. I. 77. The cases of Lansburgh v. District of Columbia, 11 App. D. C. 512 and Humes v. City of Fort Smith, 93 Fed. 857, are discusssed and held riot to justify the