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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES Lumbermen's Ass'n, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 119, that defendants had a perfect legal right to refuse to sell to plaintiff any drugs and druggists' supplies owned by them, and that it would have been wholly immaterial whether the refusal was the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice, if the bare refusal to sell had been the head and front of their offending. But, says the court, the refusal to sell was not the exercise of a legal right if that refusal was a mere step in the development and enforcement of a scheme to forestall the market in restraint of trade, or to drive the plaintiff into becoming a member of an organization which would control the price's he could charge for his wares and which would thereby deprive him of the liberty to contract for the sale of his goods according to his own judgment of their value. Whilst an act which is in itself lawful can never become unlawful because it may be done by several persons instead of only one, yet the same act may be unlawful when it is a means of accom plishing an unlawful act. In other words, the court holds that the motive with which an act is done governs as to whether such act is lawful or not, and by way of illustration mentions that while the receiving of stolen goods is not in itself unlawful, yet wheie such goods are received with knowledge that they have been stolen, the act becomes a criminal offense. In support of this position the court cites Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011 In this case the court also denned the word " boycott," saying: " A boycott means the confederation, generally secret, by many persons whose intent is to injure another by pre venting all persons from doing business with him, through fear of incurring the displeasure, perse cution, and vengeance of the conspirators." See "Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation," by Jeremiah Smith in the February Harvard Law Review. TORTS. (Trade Unions). N. J. — A case deal ing with an interesting phase of the rights and powers of labor or tracle unions is that of Brennan v. United Hatters of North America, 65 Atl. Rep. 165. A trade union claimed the right, under its constitution and by-laws, to procure the dismissal of a member from his employment on his suspen sion from the union. The court questions whether any member of a union can make an agreement with such union that on his proper conviction on charges submitted and tried in accordance with the union's rules he shall lose his place of employ ment and his opportunity of gaining other employ

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ment within the union's district. As bearing on this question the court cites: Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297; Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5; Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011, and Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603. The court main tains that the Bill of Rights confers on every man the right to engage in such lawful business or occupation as he may choose, free from hin drance or obstructions by his fellowmen, save such as may result from the exercise of equal or superior rights on their part. The right of one seeking employment to have every opportiyiity to gain employment and to retain a position, once it is gained, is as precious in the eye of the law as the right of the employer. Actions, like the one at Bar, which was brought by the suspended member of the union to recover damages from the union for interference with his employment, the court holds are essentially analogous to the familiar actions for enticing away servants. In view of this, such cases cannot be considered exactly as novelties. WAYS. (Travelers.) Vt. — In Howrigan v. Bakersfield, 64 Atl. Rep. 1130, the liability of a town for injuries to a horse on a highway bridge turned on the question whether or not the horse walking along the highway alone could be con sidered as a traveler. This the court says de pended on the question as to whether or not the owner of the horse was guilty of contributory negligence. If the horse escaped onto the high way without the owner's fault or negligence, then he was not at large in a legal sense of the term, and was while following its natural instincts to return home, a traveler on the highway. The word " traveling " the court says has no very precise or technical meaning when it is used with out any limitation. Its primary meaning is passing from place to place. If horses or cattle are forced or frightened from an inclosure over a lawful fence onto a highway, the owner or keeper being without fault, they cannot be said to be at large or astray, but their owners are entitled to have them protected as travelers. In support of its decision the court cites: Holden v. Shattuck. 34 Ct. 336; Coles v. Burns, 21 Hun 246; Common wealth ex rel. Wilson v. Fourteen Hogs, 10 Serg. & R. 393; Goener v. Woll, 26 Minn. 154, 2 N. W. 163; Kinder v. Gillespie, 63 Ill. 88; Montgomery v. Breed, 34 Wis. 649.