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THE GREEN BAG

a sale in strict accordance with the terras of a trust deed in which the wife of the grantor had not joined. The crucial point was, whether or not such a sale would be considered a judicial sale; if it was a judicial sale, the dower rights of the grantor's wife would be barred. The court held that the sale was a judicial one under a statutory provision that trust deeds may be foreclosed in accordance with their terms. In support of this decision the court cites Sturdevant v. Norris, 30 Iowa 65, and Stidger v. Evans, 64 Iowa 91, 19 N. W. 850. In the first case it was held that a foreclosure of a mortgage by notice in accordance with its provisions and without pro ceedings in court was in fact a judicial sale, al though such mode of foreclosure was not strictly within the ordinary definition of a judicial sale. In the second case it was held that a sale by ail assignee to whom property had been conveyed by a general assignment for the benefit of creditors under a statute providing for such an assignment, was a sale within the rule announced in the Sturdevant case. STATUTES. (Repeal — Elkins Law.) U. S. D. C. H. D. Ill. — In a prosecution for violation of the Elkins Law in which a point of law of vital importance to further prosecutions by the govern ment is determined, is the recent case of United States v. Standard Oil Company, 148 Fed. Rep. 719. Inasmuch as the new rate law expressly repeals all laws in conflict with its provisions with the proviso that the new law shall not affect cases now pending in the courts of the United States, defendant sought to escape prosecution for penalties incurred under the Elkins Law, prose cuted under indictments found subsequent to the enactment and approval of the New Rate Law. Under the statute providing that the repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act so expressly provide, the court held that the repeal of the parts of the Elkins Law conflicting with the New Rate Law did not extinguish penalties previously incurred under the Elkins Law. It was contended that this law was an unwarranted interference with the authority of succeeding Congresses by limiting the effect to be given to the statute, but the court held that the law was only the sub stitution of a new rule of construction to be observed by the courts with respect to laws to be thereafter enacted, and which could be abrogated by any subsequent Congress, but was to be fol lowed until so abrogated. It was further con tended that inasmuch as the saving clause of the New Rate Law specifically authorizing the prose cutions of "causes now pending," Congress must

be presumed to have thereby expressed its inten tion that prosecutions could not subsequently be commenced and prosecuted for penalties incurred under the old law, but the court ruled against the contention of defendant on this point and quoted with approval the rule laid down by Judge Grosscup in the case of Lang v. United States, 133 Federal 201, 66 Circuit Court of Appeals 255, and expressed its disapproval of the ruling to the contrary in State v. Showers, 34 Kansas 269, 86 Pacific 474. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES. (Forgery of Tele gram by Agent — Liability of Company.) Mo. Ct. of App. — In Usher v. Western Union Tele graph Co., 98 S. W. Rep. 84, the court distin guishes between the liability of a telegraph com pany for the transmission of a forged or fraudulent telegram filed with it by a stranger and liability for the transmission of a forged or fraudulent telegram forged by its own agent. The court admits that at first view the two obligations look to be so near akin as to be substantially alike. But in the first case the obligation upon the company is that its agent will be careful and prudent, the business considered, in guarding against imposition in sending forged telegrams. In the second case there is an absolute assurance that the agent himself has not forged the tele gram, the agent acting within the apparent scope of his authority.

TORTS. (Boycott.) Md. — In the case of Klingel's Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme, 64 Atl. Rep. 1029, an association of retail druggists in a city and wholesale druggists had formed a com bination to maintain a maximum schedule of prices, and in pursuance of this plan had refused to sell to a retailer who had refused to join the combination, and coerced and intimidated vendors of like commodities by means of threats to black list and boycott such vendors if they sold to the retailer in question. As a result such vendors had been deterred from selling goods to the retailer, and he brought suit to recover for dam ages to his business. A combination to exact and maintain maximum schedules of prices for drugs and druggists' supplies the court holds to be a criminal conspiracy at law, and punishable as such, and it is not necessary that a total suppression of the trade in the commodities should be accom plished in order to render the combination invalid. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 17s U. S. 244, 20 Sup. Ct. 96. See also Morris Run Coal Co. v. Bartley Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 8 Am. Rep. 159, and People v. North River Sugar Refin ing Co., 3 N. Y. Supp. 401. It was conceded on authority of Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Northwestern