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THE GREEN BAG

what distinguishes an apartment house from a flat. In the case of Lignot v. Jaekle, 65 Atl. Rep. 221, the court defines a flat or flat-house as any building consisting of more than one story in which building there are one or more suites of rooms on each floor equipped for separate house keeping purposes. A house containing two or more such flats is a " flat-house." An apartment house is either a building otherwise termed a flat or flat-house, or it is a building divided into separ ate suites of rooms intended for residence but commonly without facilities for cooking. In this case it was contended that the amount of rent paid would determine whether a house was a flathouse or an apartment house. Conceding this, the court holds that thirty-five to forty dollars a month rent will not convert what is otherwise a flat into an apartment. GIFTS. (Presumptions.) N. Y. — In Piatt v. Elias, 79 N. E. Rep. 1, the court holds that the presumption of undue influence in the case of a gift by a man to a woman with whom he has a meretricious connection is only a presumption of fact, which merely warrants deducing the exer cise of undue influence from the fact that the sexual relations between the parties were improper, and does not absolutely demand that such an inference shall be drawn from the fact. In support of this proposition, the court cites Dean v. Negley, 41 Pennsylvania 312, 18 American Decisions 620. INSURANCE. (Statute prohibiting Forfeiture.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — In Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 126, it is held that a state statute cutting off any defense by a life insurance company, domestic or foreign, based on false and fraudulent statements in the application unless the matter misrepresented actually contributed to the death of the insured, is held to be constitutional as it is applicable alike to all life insurance companies doing business in the state and does not deprive a foreign com pany of its liberty or property without due pro cess of law; the liberty referred to in the fourteenth amendment being the liberty of a natural, not an artificial person. This case adds the sanction of the Supreme Court of the nation to the doctrine that the business of life insurance is " a business affected with a public interest " to much the same extent as the savings bank, and that on this account the states may regulate the conduct of insurance companies ■even after the grant of a charter which has reserved no right of regulation. In this view of the case it is immaterial whether the business is carried on by A corporation, a partnership, or even a single individual. Andrew A. Bruce.

INSURANCE. (Warranty — Defense.) Vt. — Scofield's Adm'x v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 64 Atl. Rep. 1107, is an illustration of the length to which insurance companies often go in order to show breaches of warranties in insurance policies. In this case it appeared that a brother of insured had received a letter from him mailed in Colorado. In consequence thereof counsel for the insurance company contended that the trial court should allow them to argue to the jury that California and Colorado were resorts for con sumptives, and in their briefs on appeal contended that the court should take judicial notice of the fact that Colorado was a place to which consump tives resort. The mere fact that a letter had been received from insured, mailed in Colorado, the court held, did not have any tendency to prove that the insured resided in Colorado, nor did it have any tendency to prove that he had consump tion. The letter might have been mailed by in sured while passing through Colorado, as well as it might have been mailed by him while residing there. Besides, the court would hesitate to hold that even if the evidence did in fact have a ten dency to prove that insured had gone to Colorado to reside temporarily or oermanently, that such fact was evidence of the fact that he then had consumption. In other words, it may be said that the case holds that mere removal to the abovenamed state does not raise the presumption that the person moving there is suffering from pulmon ary troubles. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. (Use of Street by Building Contractor — Effect Thereof.) Wis. — A rather novel point comes up for consideration in Compty v. C. H. Starke Dredge & Dock Com pany, 109 N. W. Rep. 650. Plaintiff, an infant, was injured by a splinter from a pile being driven by defendant, a building contractor. At the time of the injury, plaintiff was sitting on building materials placed by defendant in the street in front of the lot on which the building was in course of construction and where the pile was being driven. Defendant insisted that it was only liable for gross negligence, as, in the exercise of defendant's lawful right to place in the street building materials inconsistent with occupation thereof for travel, it had temporarily ceased to be subject to such latter use, that therefore persons on that part of the street occupied by defendant's building materials were trespassers. The court, however, maintains that the exercise of the right of a lot owner to incumber an adjoining street with building materials, does not transpose the street into private property. It is merely, the court says, one of the lawful uses of the space as a public street, and is in deference to the rights of