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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES tional provision, limiting the power to assess and collect taxes for the purpose of such corporation, by vote order the erection of an auditorium for public purposes even though it be incidentally used for conventions and national associations. PROPERTY. (Taxation.) Cal. — The right to assess the poles and wires of a telegraph company for the construction of an irrigation ditch was in volved in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Modesto Irrigation Co., 87 Pac. 190. The telegraph com pany had erected its poles and wires on the land of a railroad company under a contract by which such poles and wires were reserved to the tele graph company as personal property. As the poles and wires could be easily removed, and were in no sense essential to the support of that to which they were attached, the court held that they could properly be considered as personal property. Therefore they were not assessable for the revenue purposes of the irrigation district. Furthermore, Cal. Pol. Code (§§ 3617, 3663), in defining real estate for taxable purposes as land including the improvements, expressly excepts telegraph lines, and makes them assessable as personalty. These provisions the court regarded as prevailing. Hence the poles and wires of the telegraph com pany were not under the statutes assessable for the purposes of the irrigation district. PROPERTY. (Tax Deed — Sufficiency of De scription.) Wash. — Generally, courts construe tax deeds strictly against grantees, but in Ontario Land Company v. Yordy, 87 Pac. Rep. 257, the court appears to exercise a good deal of liberality for the purpose of upholding a conveyance by a tax deed. An owner of land, in platting the same as an addition to a city, numbered the blocks con secutively except that where blocks 352 and 372 would ordinarily have appeared a rectangular tract was shown, marked " reserved." Subsequently, this reserved tract was listed for taxation de scribed as blocks 352 and 372 in the designated addition. A tax deed was issued, describing the property as blocks 352 and 372. Subsequently, the one who had made the original plat platted this rectangular tract as another addition to the city, and subdivided it into blocks, numbering them from 1 to 4 inclusive. The court, however, upholds the tax deed as a sufficient conveyance of the tract. The original owner had paid no taxes on the reserved tract for years and had made no inquiry as to such taxes. The tract was located where blocks 352 and 372 should have been if the regular order of numbering had been carried out. PROPERTY. (Vendor and Purchaser — De fective Title — Effect of Condemnation Proceed ings.) Wash. — Usually, it is agreed in contracts

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for the conveyance of real estate that if the title is not good or cannot be made good within a sufficient time, the purchaser shall have the right to rescind the contract. A contract of this nature was in volved in Miller v. Calvin. Philips & Co., 87 Pac. Rep. 264, and the question therein was whether or not the pendency of condemnation proceedings by a railroad for the acquirement of a right of way constituted such a defect in the title as to entitle the purchaser to a refund of his earnest money. In disposing of this question in favor of the purchaser, the court states its reasons as follows: " Can it be said with any degree of reason that, after the com mencement of the condemnation proceedings, and the filing of the lis pendens by the railroad com pany, a good title without defect could have been given by the appellant? It may be that a convey ance any time before the condemnation proceed ings culminated in vesting the title in the railroad company would convey to the grantee the right to receive the damages allowed for the taking; but the value of the damages for the taking was not the subject of the contract — was not what the respondent expected to buy, or the appellant in tended to sell. Under such contract it has been universally decided that the grantee is entitled to a marketable title — to an indubitable title — and that he cannot be compelled to buy a lawsuit, or a title that will involve him in litigation, but that he has a right to a title which will enable him to hold possession of hisland in peace and security." PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION. (Negli gence.) Fla. — Mugge v. Tampa Waterworks Company, 42 So., 81, is a carefully considered case, involving a question as to which there is great conflict of authority, the question being as to the liability of a water company to a citizen for loss of property by fire on account of an insufficiency of water, arising from the negligence of the company. Defendant water works company entered into a contract with the city of Tampa, whereby the company enjoyed extensive franchises, such as the right to use the streets with its mains and hydrants, and to have special taxes levied on the property of the citizens, to be paid to the company for its supply of water for public use in the extinguishment of fires Plaintiff's building baving caught on fire, and the fire department having promptly re sponded to the alarm, the water mains on account of defendant's negligence were found without appreciable pressure and failed to yield any appreciable flow of water, whereby the building was destroyed, and plaintiff sued the water company. The first case cited by the court is Nickerson v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Company, 46 Conn. 24, 33 Am. Rep. 1, the same being the first