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THE GREEN BAG

INFANTS. (Criminal Responsibility.) Ga. — In Anthony v. State, 55 S. E. 479, the court re affirms the doctrine announced in Vinson v. State, 52 S. E. 79, 124 Ga. 19, that a minor who has ar rived at the age of criminal responsibility may be convicted under the Act of 1903 of the fraudulent practices made penal by that act, although a con tract for services made by him may not be civilly enforceable. Furthermore, the court in this case holds that though proof that a minor left the ser vice of his employer in obedience to parental authority will suffice to rebut all presumptions of fraudulent intent, yet the bare fact that the minor told his employer that he yielded to the command of a stranger to go to work for him can afford the minor no excuse in the absence of a satisfactory showing that he did so under fear of duress, rather than voluntarily and with the purpose of defraud ing his employer in accordance with a previously formed intent. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. (Taxation.) Col. — In City and County of Denver v. Hallett, 83 Pacific Reporter 1066, was questioned the power of a city to build an auditorium and to issue bonds for such purpose. The constitution of Colorado grants home rule to Denver and provides that the people thereof shall always have the exclusive power of making, altering, revising, or amending their charter, thereby bestowing upon the people of such city every power possessed by the state legislature. It was contended by counsel for a taxpayer who brought suit to restrain the issuance of bonds for an auditorium and conceded by the court that the constitution did not expressly grant the power to build an auditorium, that such power was not incident to nor implied in the powers granted and that an auditorium was not indispen sable to the objects and purposes of the munici pality as declared by the article of the constitution granting home rule to the city, but the court held that under the constitution the city had every power possessed by the legislature. Therefore, the main question was whether or not the legis lature could authorize the city to purchase a site for and build an auditorium. The court notes that for many years Denver has had the power under her charter to appropriate funds for the entertainment of visitors and for the expenses of funerals, to take an enumeration of the inhabi tants, to foster and encourage manufactories, to lay out and ornament grounds for a cemetery and sell lots therein, and to support or own a public library. None of these powers, the court main tains, can be regarded as indispensable to a muni cipality, but municipalities are permitted to exer cise them because they tend to the advancement, the culture, the convenience, and the general wel

fare of the public. The court, therefore, is of the opinion that the authority thus exercised by the city can be extended to include the power to erect an auditorium. To fortify its position the court cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions wherein the powers of municipal corporations have been greatly extended. Thus the court cites Peo ple v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475, upholding a statute authorizing the cities of New York and Brooklyn to build a bridge over the East River; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 8 Am. Rep. 24, sustain ing an act authorizing the city of Cincinnati to construct a railroad between that city and Chat tanooga; State v. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556, 74 N. W. 59, 39 L. R. A. 513, 68 Am. St. Rep. 629, sustain ing the validity of a law authorizing counties to participate in interstate expositions, to issue bonds for such purposes and to erect and maintain suit able buildings therefor; Sun Printing Co. v. New York, 152 N. Y. 257, 46 N. E. 499, 37 L. R. A. 788, affirming the power of the legislature to invest the city of New York with authority to build a railroad within the limits of the city and issue bonds to meet the indebtedness. In addition the court notes that the city of Brooklyn has power to establish and maintain public baths (Poillon v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 132, 4 N. E. 191); that in Massachusetts towns have power to raise money by taxation for celebrations (Hill v. Easthampton, 140 Mass. 381, 4 N. E. 811), and may appropriate money for public concerts by a band (Hubbard v. Taunton, 140 Mass. 467, 5 N. E. 157); that a memorial hall to be used and maintained as a memorial to the soldiers and sailors of the War of the Rebellion may properly be deemed a public purpose (Kingman v. Brockton (Mass.) 26 N. E. 998, 11 L. R. A. 123); that the officers of a school district in Vermont may build a hall in connection with a schoolhouse to accommodate the schools and inhabitants of the district for the purpose of examinations and exhibitions Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt. 207); that a Vermont town may build a town hall, though the upper part thereof is known as the " Opera Hall," and incidentally used for theatrical purposes (Bates v. Bassett, 60 Vt. 530, 15 Atl. 200, 1 L. R. A. 166); that in Ten nessee the city of Knoxville has been empowered to appropriate money in aid of a college located without the city limits (East Tennessee Univer sity v. Knoxville, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 166); and that the city of Philadelphia has power to entertain distinguished visitors at public expense (Tatham v. Philadelphia, n Phila. (Pa.) 276). If the powers above enumerated could be exercised by municipalities, towns, and counties, the court argues that there is no apparent reason why the taxpayers of Denver may not under a constitu