Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 18.pdf/99

 THE GREEN BAG ing the concurrence of the President, the Senate, and some foreign nation or poten tate. If^ one schedule can be raised or lowered, all can be. If one can be repealed in whole or in part, so may they all. It can be done with one or a number of treaties; with one nation or several. In this respect the power is unlimited. A revenue law enacted after full consideration by the House and Senate, and approved by one President, if this theory is sound, can be repealed by another President, the Senate concurring, with the aid of any foreign nation that will become a party to the international contract. It would be quite possible for the President and Senate, with the aid of a complacent foreign nation, to -change our fiscal policy from protection to free trade. If there was no foreign nation sufficiently accommodating, who shall say it could not be created for the occasion while you wait, and the wait need not be unduly prolonged. Moreover, it is to be borne in mind that such a change could not be overcome by the Congress and the will of the people re-estab lished, because such action would require the concurrence of the Senate, and the Senate in such a case would hardly concur to reverse itself. Here you would have the Congress tied hand and foot. Moreover, it can be argued with considerable force that this pretension is inconsistent with the power vested in Con gress, "to regulate commerce with foreign nations." Why should plenary power to regulate commerce be vested by the same instrument in two different departments? I believe the pretension to be utterly with out foundation, and that the House of Repre sentatives never will abandon its greatest constitutional prerogative of originating revenue legislation. While patronage and the sole power of re moval by the executive had, in 1835, accord ing to Webster, reached an "alarming height," I doubt if, as he feared, it "seri ously threatens the government's future

prosperity. " His contention that the execu tive alone could not remove has long been exploded. The President now nominates, subject to confirmation by the Senate, 7,233 officials (not including the diplomatic and consular service). Twenty-six, who are not subject to such approval, and heads of departments and other officials, appoint 284,652; in all, 291,911. Nearly all of these 284,652 are under the civil service rules, and in theory, at least, not subject to re moval for political reasons. Under a recent order of the PostmasterGeneral 183,018, with salaries of over $25,000,000, are supposed now to have a right to reappointment on . their merits, against even a congressional recommenda tion. It is said to be an effort to remove that service from politics, and should that prove to be the fact, as I trust and believe it will, will result in an extensive limitation of executive power, a limitation it is to be observed that has been voluntarily imposed by the President himself. Popular discussion seems to have vested the President with prerogatives that were omitted in his constitutional grant of powers. His only constitutional connection with legislation, that I have been able to find, is the approval or disapproval of acts of Con gress and from time to time giving to Con gress information of the state of the Union and recommending "to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." A recommendation once made, his full power is exercised, and its fate, from a constitutional standpoint, is of no concern to him. Beyond question, it is the duty of the Congress to consider care fully and respectfully his recommendations. The President's wishes or desires are also entitled to fair consideration. It is also the duty and privilege of each member of Con gress to reach his own conclusions, as he alone is responsible for his action, even though his view of the public welfare requires him to reject a recommendation. The judgment upon which a member acts