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Nunnemacher v. State, 108 Northwestern Reporter 627, which is a case involving the Collateral Inheri tance Tax Law of Wisconsin. The court holds that the right to take property by will is a natural right protected by the constitution, which cannot be wholly taken away or impaired by the legisla ture. Judge Winslow writing the majority opin ion says that he is fully aware that the contrary propo sition has been stated by a great majority of the courts of this country, including the Supreme Court of the United States, but the unanimity with which it is stated is perhaps only equalled by the paucity of reasoning by which it is supported. He then takes up and criticises Magoun v. Bank. 170 United States 283, 18 Supreme Court 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037; Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat. (Va.) 422, 73 Am. Dec. 367, and Pullen v. Commissioners, 66 N. C. 361. The right to inherit is traced from the earliest times down to the present. But though the court holds that the right to take property by descent is natural and inherent, it is, nevertheless, of the opinion that the principle of inheritance taxation may be justified under the power of rea sonable regulation and taxation of transfers of property. In a separate concurring opinion Judge Marshall waxes eloquent in his approval of the doctrine announced by Judge Winslow, that the right to inherit is a natural and inheritant one. The dictum on this point even of a sound lawyer like Judge Winslow, will hardly outweigh history and authority. J. H. B. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Liberty — Dipso maniacs.) Neb. — The force and effect and validity of a Dipsomaniac Law, now quite com mon in some of our western states, comes in for consideration in ex parte Schwarting, 108 North western Reporter, 125. The general provisions of the law providing for the treatment of dipso maniacs in a hospital for insane, is upheld on the broad principle that as jurisdiction is assumed to take care of the property of a person who has be come incompetent to care for the same by reason of the excessive use of intoxicants and narcotics, jurisdiction may likewise be assumed of the per son of such inebriate, but a section of the law pro viding that an inebriate when discharged as cured shall be discharged only on parole, is held uncon stitutional on the ground that it violates the right to personal liberty. The court maintains that the legislature has no power to impose restraint on the personal liberty of an individual after he has been restored to health and to the control of his appetites. When he is cured he stands upon an equality with all other citizens, therefore he cannot be required to make report of his behavior to the superintendent of the hospital, nor can he be returned without

further proceedings when he fails to make such report, or to fulfil the conditions on which he is discharged. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Police Power — Child Labor.) Ore. — Laws regulating the hours of labor and the conditions under which labor may be performed have been passed upon recently in many of the states, and regulations as to the employment of children are a particularly interesting branch of this general subject. The Supreme Court of Oregon, in the case of State v. Shorey, 86 Pac. 88 1, upholds a provision of the laws of 1905 prohibiting the employment of a child under 1 6 years of age for a longer period than ten hours in any one day, nor more than six days in any week, and also provided that not less than thirty minutes should be allowed for meal time at noon, and that such time must not be included as part of the work hours of the day. The law was attacked because it was claimed to be in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, and also of section r, article i, of the constitution of Oregon, which reads: " We de clare that all men when they form a social com pact are equal in rights." The court takes the position that these two constitutional provisions do not limit the power of the state to interfere with the parental control of minors, or to regulate the right of a minor to contract, or of others to contract with him. The ' court affirms the doc trine that it is competent for the state to forbid the employment of children in certain callings merely because it believes such prohibition to be for their best good, although the prohibited .em ployment does not involve any direct danger to morals, decency, or of life or limb, and points out that such regulation is on a different basis from laws prohibiting the employment of adults for more than a certain number of hours per week. These latter regulations are always founded upon the protection of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and the right of an adult to work on such terms as may be agreed between him and the employer is recognized as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the federal con stitution. But in emphasizing the distinction be tween adults and minors, the court says: " They are not sui juris, and can only contract to a limited extent. They are wards of the state and subject to its control. As to them the state stands in the position of parens patritr and may exercise un limited supervision and control over their con tracts, occupation, and conduct, and the liberty and right of those who assume to deal with them. This is a power which inheres in the government for its own preservation and for the protection of thQ life, person, health, and morals of its future citizens." " The supervision and control of