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bow far creditors and purchasers shall be pro tected against outstanding interests that they could not readily discover. It is the conflict be tween the desire to protect property interests and the desire to render transactions in property easy, i.e., to aid commerce. Since the recording acts cover almost all cases of this particular kind, concerning chattel mortgages, the question does not often arise. Possibly on the whole the court is right. Let the legislature extend the record ing acts to all chattel mortgages if relief is neces sary. • 4. Taking possession of goods in accordance with a mortgage on future-acquired goods, the mortgage having been made more than four months before the bankruptcy proceedings, but the possession being taken within the four months, is not a preference. As an original proposition this seems wrong. Before the taking of posses sion the mortgagee, according to the Vermont law, has no lien which is valid, as against creditors. By taking possession he acquires such a lien. That is gaining a distinct preferment and without the four months. But the United States Supreme Court has held that such a taking of possession is not a preference. Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516. That makes argument useless. See on the whole subject a careful discussion by Professor Williston in 19 Harv. Law Rev. 557. C. B. Whittier. CONTRACTS. (Competition Bidding — Lowest Responsible Bidder.) N. J. — The Supreme Court of New Jersey construing the provisions of the Laws of 1904, requiring a municipal board of education to award contracts for school supplies to the lowest responsible bidder, holds in the case of Jacobson v. Board of Education, 64 At). 609, that the board cannot arbitrarily reject certain bidders as not being responsible, but must give notice of their action to such bidder and afford him an opportunity to be heard. The court states that in the present case the evidence indicates that the board would have been justified upon proper proceedings in adjudjfing that the lowest bidders were not proper persons to have the con tract, because it arouses suspicions of fraudulent acts on the bidder's part in previous dealings with the board, but it is held that a determination against the responsibility of the bidder is a judicial matter requiring notice to him and an opportunity to be heard. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Equity Jurisdic tion.) H. J. — The validity of a rather novel statute was questioned in Mayor, etc., of Borough of Metu9hen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 64 Atlantic, 484. By Public Laws, New Jersey, 1903, p. 660, § 29, it is provided that if a railroad com

pany shall neglect to construct and maintain bridges or highway crossings properly, as required by law, it sh 11 be lawful for the governing body of a township or municipality to proceed by suit in equity to compel the specific performance im posed by law, and the court shall prescribe the crossing to be constructed or the repairs to be made. This section, it was contended, was uncon stitutional on the ground that the legislature has no power to confer on the court the right and power to give to a municipality compulsory remedy by way of compelling specific performance, by a railroad company, of its duties as to the construc tion and maintenance of highway crossings as contradistinguished from its power to give it a preventative remedy. But the court considered that the question was settled in favor of the val idity of the statute by Palmyra v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 63 N. J. Eq. 799, 52 All. 1132, and Eckert v. Perth, Amboy & Woodbridge Railroad Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 777, 57 Atl. 438, wherein a statute providing for compulsory proceedings to estab lish gates or bars across a railway was upheld. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Game Laws.) Ark. — Laws passed for the preservation and pro tection of game have been recently construed in a number of states, the game law of Arkansas having been previously referred to in this department. One of its provisions is that it shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to ship or carry beyond the lines of the state certain kinds of game. and that any express company so receiving the same for shipment shall be guilty of a misde meanor. In Wells- Fargo Express Co. v. State, 96 S. W. 189, the express company was prosecuted and convicted for receiving a shipment of game for transportation beyond. the state in packages marked as containing furs. The express com pany had no knowledge of the fact that the pack ages did not contain furs but contained game. The court holds, however, that this fact can be no defense to a prosecution under this statute, saying that it is competent for the legislature to make the receipt of game an offense irrespective of knowledge or intent as to the contents of the package. In support of this holding the court cites its own decision in State v. Lancaster. 36 Ark. 55, which was a conviction for a sale of liquor to a minor irrespective of ignorance of his minority, and also cites Judge Cooley in People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 18 N. W. 365, as follows: " Many statutes which are in the nature of police regula tions, as this is, impose criminal penalties irre spective of any intent to violate them; the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the pro tection of the public which shall render violation impossible." The court also passes on the ques