Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 18.pdf/69

 THE GREEN BAG the theory of the law is that taking from a bailee who has a right to possession is larceny because he has added value to the chattel, or whether it is not simply because of the fact that the property has been taken from the person who, as against the taker, is entitled to possession. Thus, a person holding goods under an obligation to pay duties on them, or a pledgee holding as collateral for a past debt, can hardly be said to have added value tr the articles, yet a felonious taking from them is lar ceny. Rex. v. Wilkinson, Rus. & Ry. 470; Henry v. State, no Ga. 750, 36 S. E. 55. A thief cannot be said to have added value, either as against the owner or the world at large, yet a taking from him by a third person may be larceny. Ward v. People, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 395. Harry A. Bigelow. DAMAGES. (Evidence — Future Suffering.) Wash. — The Supreme Court of Washington has recently announced, in a very unpretentious manner, with little attempt at argument, and no citation of authority, a doctrine which appears to be essentially sensible, but which is a little outside the line of the authorities. Most briefly stated, the holding is that the fact that a man gled hand will cause future suffering is such a a matter of common knowledge that in an action for the injury the question of damages from future suffering may be submitted to the jury, though there is no evidence upon the question. It is difficult to see what practical value evidence as to future suffering could have, or, except in cases where expert evidence as to the possibility or probability of future complications is neces sary, how even the amount of suffering that would probably result could be made much clearer to the jury by testimony than by their own judgment and experience. Kirkham v. WheelerOsgood Co., 81 Pacific Reporter, 869. INSURANCE. (Construction of Policy — 41 Fire." ) U. S. C. C. A. — Western Woolen Mills Co. v. Northern Assurance Co. of London, 139 Federal Reporter, 637, turns really upon the mean ing of a word but is valuable as well as illustra ting a general principle in the construction of contracts. It is held in general terms that the word "fire" as used in an insurance policy, in the absence of language showing a contrary intention, is to be given its ordinary meaning, which includes the idea of visible light and heat. The policy involved in the litigation insured a quantity of wool against loss or damage by fire. The wool became submerged for several days during a flood, which caused spontaneous com bustion, with smoke and great heat, by which the wool was damaged and its fiber destroyed,

but there was no visible flame or glow. It was argued that as the chemical process which de stroyed the wool was that of combustion, the wool was destroyed by fire within the meaning of the policy. This contention, however, is negatived by the court, which holds that while the process is chemically the same, nevertheless oxidation is not referred to as fire unless it results in visible flame. FEDERAL COURTS. (Jurisdiction.) U. S. C. C. for N. D. of N. Y. — Ingraham v. National Salt Co., 139 Federal Reporter, 684 involves an inter esting and comparatively novel question relative to conflict of jurisdiction. Plaintiff in an action in a federal court against, defendant, a corporation, procured the issuance of an attachment, which was levied on real estate of the defendant. Pending the action, insolvency proceedings against defendant were instituted in a state court, which, through receivers, took possession of all of defendant's property, includ ing that attached, and sold the same; the execu tion of a conveyance, however, having been deferred, for the convenience of the purchaser, until final settlement of the insolvent estate. Sub sequently plaintiff recovered judgment in the federal court, and an execution was issued, under which the marshal advertised the attached prop erty for sale. Thereupon the state court en joined such sale in a suit instituted by its receivers against plaintiff, and the marshal, in which the validity of the attachment was attacked held, that while, under the principle of certain decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the authority of the state court to deprive the federal court of control of its own process and to draw to itself the determination of the validity of the attachment lien was doubtful, where its own jurisdiction over the property was acquired after the lien attached, yet in view of other federal decisions holding that the levy of an attachment on real estate does not give the court issuing the attachment either actual or construction posses sion of the land, nor prevent its subsequent seizure by a court of another jurisdiction, the federal court would not enjoin the receivers from further prosecuting their suit, but would await the final determination thereof by state tribunals. Had this been an attachment of personal prop erty of which the attaching officer takes actual physical possession so that the residue is in the possession of the Federal Court, that court having; once taken jurisdiction would have retained exclu sive control of the property so that no State court could subsequently interfere with it.