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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES CONTRACTS. (Consideration.) N. Y. Surro gate Ct. — A rather curious writing is enforced, apparently as a contract, in the case of In re Todd's Estate, 95 N. Y. Supp. 211. The evidence showed that decedent, who was a wandering peddler, had stayed at the house of claimant and her husband for several days at a time, five or six times a year during a number of years, and that no charge had ever been made for his entertain ment and care. Before his death he executed an instrument which he entitled a "unique charity," which was as follows: "I promise Maggie Mattice $5,000 when I die.^for all my trouble and all her kindness to me. I also killed her canary bird to-day for which she must have her pay, for this account must be paid after my death from my estate." It was contended by the administrator that the paper was not a promissory note and did not acknowledge an indebtedness; that it was without consideration, and was merely a promise to give and not to pay, and not being executed in accordance with the statutes, was not valid as a will. It is, however, held, that while the $5,000 was more than compensation for the services which had been rendered, and was undoubtedly known by the decedent so to be, yet he, nevertheless, had a right to give an exorbitant price if he saw fit to do so, and that though this amounted to a charity his promise was enforceable in the law. Promises to give after death have been sus tained in New York upon very slight considera tion. Matter of Steglich, 91 App. Div. 75, 86 N. Y. Supp. 257; Bush v. Whitaker, 45 Misc. 74. 91 N. Y. Supp. 6 1 6. In the case digested above it is not made clear by the report whether the services had all been rendered as a mere matter of friendly hospitality before the promise was made. If so, there would seem to be no considera tion, other than a past consideration, so far as those services were concerned. There would remain then only the liquidation of the claim in tort for killing the canary as a consideration for the promise. CONTRACTS. (Employment by the Year — Corporations.) N. Y. S. C., App. Div. — The con struction of a contract of employment and its binding effect upon various successors of an origi nal employer and a rather unusual state of facts as contained in Baker v. D. Appleton & Co., 95 N. Y. Supp. 125. D. Appleton & Company, while a partnership, employed plaintiff for a year at an annual salary. He continued in the service of the firm for several years for the same compen sation. The firm then formed a corporation and he worked for it in the same capacity and for the same compensation. The corporation passed into

the hands of a receiver, and he discharged plain tiff without cause. The receiver transferred the property to a second corporation of the same name, subject to the payment of the debts of the first corporation and of the receiver. In an action against the second corporation, it was held that plaintiff had a yearly contract with the firm and the first corporation, entitling him to recover from the second corporation for his wrongful discharge under the assumption of the debts of the first corporation. CONTRACTS. (Illegality — Employers' Asso ciation.) N. Y. S. C. — The legality of an em ployers' organization, somewhat corresponding to the labor union of employes, is collaterally in volved in City Trust, Safe Deposit & Surety Com pany of Philadelphia v. Waldhauer, 95 N. Y. Supp. 222. Employers of labor in the building trades formed an organization to secure stability in conditions and certainty with respect to the performance of contracts by obtaining an agree ment with their employes for arbitration instead of sympathetic strikes. Defendant, who was an employer, became a member of the association and gave a bond obligating him to obey its regulations and orders. Thereafter the association, endeavor ing to provide against strikes, arranged with the men entering their employment to sign an agree ment to arbitrate their differences, and sent to each member of the association a resolution that no members should employ workmen who had not signed. Defendant laid off his men for a few weeks, but afterwards took them back without the consent of the association, and without asking them whether they had signed the arbitration agreement. On demand of the association, the surety company, which had become surety on defendant's bond, paid the penalty provided therein. Referring to the line of cases holding that laborers have a right to organize for the purpose of securing higher wages, shorter hours, and improving their condition generally, and to strike to secure these benefits, the court declares that it must be equally true that employers also have a right to organize and refuse to employ for the purpose of accomplishing any lawful object. It is also held, that the particular order requiring defendant to abstain from employing laborers who had not signed the arbitration agreement was lawful and within the fair import of the constitution of the association, so that he was liable to the surety company because of its pay ment of the penalty accruing from the breach of the bond. In Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, it was held that an agreement between a labor union and an