Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 18.pdf/456

 NOTES OF RECENT CASES traditional lines. While the validity of primary election laws was formerly questioned on the ground that they unduly impaired the freedom of party action, it might be fairly asked in view of this new ruling to what extent the law, if it meddles with the matter at all, may leave the regulation of primary elections to the party management. The application of the doctrine of non-delegatability of legislative powers carries a new element of doubt into primary election legislation. Since the decision in the above case, the legis lature of Illinois, convened by Governor Deneen in special session for this purpose, has enacted a new primary law, which is supposed to have eliminated the defects in the former law pointed out by the Supreme Court. _ tit, r.

CORPORATIONS. (Foreign, Practice.) Mo. — The attempt of the state of Missouri to obtain sufficient information as to the methods of the Standard Oil Company on which to found a prose cution for violation of the anti-trust act of that state has given rise to a decision as to the validity of a portion of the statute which it seems has not been passed upon before. State v. Standard Oil Company of Indiana, 91 Southwestern Reporter, 1062. That part of the statute which provides that when the attorney-general in proceedings against a corporation under the anti-trust law files in court a statement giving the names of the non-resident officers of the corporation whose testimony he desires, the court shall issue a notice to the attorney of record for the corporation notifying him that the testimony of the persons named is desired and requiring him to have them present at the time and place fixed for their ex amination, is construed as merely providing a means of notifying a defendant through its at torney and declaring that notice to an attorney of record shall be notice to the client and is held to be valid. Foreign corporations doing business in the state are to be regarded as being bound by the provisions of this statute on the principle that a state may prescribe the conditions on which a foreign corporation may do business therein, and that where a foreign corporation comes into the state for business purposes pursuant to the terms prescribed by the legislature a contract binding the corporation to obey existing laws is implied, and that therefore with respect to this particular statute, foreign corporations must be regarded as having agreed that notice to their attorneys under the statute shall be notice to them. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION. (Legisla tive Power.) Kans. — A case the reasoning in which seems to be somewhat in conflict with an alogous cases from other jurisdictions, is that of

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McAllister v. Fair, 84 Pacific Reporter, 112. The decision here is that the power to declare the rule for the descent of property is vested absolutely in the legislature, and that where it has provided in plain and peremptory language that a husband shall inherit from his deceased wife and made no exception on account of criminal conduct, the court is not justified in reading into the statute a clause disinheriting a husband because he feloni ously killed his intestate wife for the purpose of acquiring her property. In answer to the natural argument that a literal interpretation of the statute might operate in some instances to en courage crime and contravene public policy, the court says that that is no reason why a plain, statutory provision should be disregarded nor why the court should attempt to determine the policy of the state on the question. The whole opinion proceeds practically upon this ground, the substance of the court's argument being con tained in the statement that the right to deter mine what is the best policy of the people is in the legislature, 'and that courts cannot assume that they have a wisdom superior to that of the legislature and proceed to inject into a statute a clause which in -their opinion would be more in consonance with good morals or accomplish bet ter justice than the rule declared by the legisla ture. In holding that the legal title passes to the murderer in such cases, so that an innocent pur chaser from him will take superior to the claims of those who would take next after the murderer, this case would seem to be sound in principle and in accord with the weight of authority. The descent of the legal title is fixed by the statute, and the courts have no power of amending it. The true solution of such cases was pointed out long ago in a note in 4 Harv. Law Rev. 394. Granting that the legal title has passed, equity might still hold the murderer as constructive trustee and require him to surrender his ill-gotten title. The overlooking of the equitable. solution of these cases and criticism of cases passing upon the legal title only as out of line with good morals is a striking instance of what I have ventured to call the decadence of equity (5 Columbia Law Review, 20). I*. ' -

The principal case was a proceeding begun in the Probate Court to obtain a distribution of the murdered wife's personal estate. The husband, who was under life sentence for the murder of his wife, assigned his interest as sole distributee of her estate to the attorney who defended him. Considering that under the Kansas statutes a per son sentenced to confinement for life "shall there after be deemed civilly dead " (General Stats.