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THE GREEN BAG

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Due Process — Game Laws.) N. Y. A decision which while doubtless correct under the statute, neverthe less goes beyond the object sought to be accom plished by game laws, is contained in People ex rel Hill v. Hesterbcrg, 76 Northeastern Reporter, 1032. The case holds in common with a number of other cases that a statute prohibiting possession of game during the closed season, even though the game comes from without the state, is not unconstitutional as depriving a person of property without due process of law. Act Congress. May 25, 1900, providing that all dead game, whether animals or birds, the importation of which is pro hibited, or any dead game carried into a state or territory for use, sale, or storage there, shall at its arrival be subject to the operation of the laws of such state, enacted in the exercise of the police powers, to the same extent as if such game had been produced in the state and shall not be ex empt therefrom by reason of being introduced in original packages, is construed as conferring on any state the right to enact laws prohibiting the possession of dead game within certain periods, whether taken within or without the state. The final holding in the case, while perhaps a necessary consequence of the ones just mentioned, seems to carry the effect of the state laws much beyond the object sought to be accomplished, which is merely the effective protection of game within the state. This holding is that where the warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violating the game laws was based on an affidavit that he had in his pos session within the prohibited time certain dead game birds, " namely an imported golden plover and an imported grouse," the further statement that such birds were different varieties of game birds from the game birds known as plover and grouse in the state of New York, and from any birds native of America, cannot be urged as a defence. This holding is made all the more strik ing by the fact that the birds in question were imported from England and Russia. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Election Laws.) Ill. — In people v. Board of Commissioners of Chicago, 77 Northeastern Reporter. 321, the Illi nois primary election law is held unconstitutional on a number of different grounds, most of which are fairly obvious; for instance, the law provides that in senatorial districts consisting of two coun ties, not more than two persons of the same politi cal party, that is one candidate for senator and one for representative, shall be nominated from any one county. It is reasonably clear that this provision is in conflict with the provision of Illi nois Constitution, Art. iv, sec. 3, fixing the eligi

bility for the office of senator or representative by requiring that he shall reside in the senatorial district for two years next preceding his election. It is also held that the provision of the law that in Cook County no party shall hold a primary election unless it cast twenty per cent of the vote at the last election for president, while outside of that county a political party which cast ten per cent of the total vote at the last presidential election may hold a primary election, is special legislation and invalid, and is also objectionable as an interference with the equality of rights and freedom of voters in the different counties. The law provides that voters in the state at large outside of Cook County may vote at primary elections by stating their present party affiliations, while a voter in Cook County is denied the right to vote, if he has voted at the primary election of another party within two years. This provi sion is deemed invalid on much the same ground as that on which the preceding one was found objectionable, and with respect to both of these it is held that the differing conditions in the state at large and in Cook County do not furnish any reasonable basis of classification justifying the special regulations with respect to Cook County. In addition to those above mentioned, the court states some other grounds of constitutional objec tion to the Illinois primary election law of 1905, one of which deserves special notice. The opinion says: This act provides that the county central committee of each political party shall determine whether the county officers shall be nominated at the primary election by the voters or by delegates chosen at such election, and also whether the candidates shall be nominated by a majority or plurality vote. If a committee decides that a majority shall be necessary, this is to be the law; but if they decide that a plurality shall elect, the candidate is to be chosen by a plurality vote. The provision amounts to a delegation of legisla tive authority to county central committees to determine what the substantial features of the law shall be, and it is therefore void. This holding presents an entirely new point in the law of primary elections. The provision that the party is to determine whether candidates are to be nominated by delegate conventions or by direct primary election, which the court does not con demn specifically, is found in the laws of many other states; and unless the party is to be deprived of the power of prescribing rules of procedure for its conventions, it will also decide ultimately whether a majority or a plurality shall elect. The provision condemned by the court was therefore no more than a recognition of party autonomy along