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THE GREEN BAG

company's actuary might deem equitable, this, however, being coupled with the provision that all the property of the superseded company should become that of the new concern. Under these statutory plans of reorganization policy holders of the mutual company could have obtained only about one third of the surplus stock of the new company. In considering the validity of this statute, the court declares that while the title to the property of a mutual insurance company is in the corporation, the equitable interest therein is vested in the members, the same as in the case of a stock corporation, and that these equitable property rights of the members are within the guaranties of the state constitution, as regards the inhibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts and the inhibition of the national constitution as regards the equal pro tection of the laws and deprivation of property without due process of law. On this basis it is determined that inasmuch as the statute under consideration would result in the distribution of the assets of the mutual company and the bestowal thereof on the reorganized corporation without the consent of all the members of the mutual com pany, it is in conflict with constitutional provisions referred to. LANDLORD AND TENANT. (See Property.) MASTER AND SERVANT. (Personal Injuries — Safe Place to Work.) N. Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 2d Dept. — A peculiar case in which liability for personal injuries was sought to be predicated upon the ground that the relation of master and servant existed, is that of Walker v. Gleason, 96 New York Supplement, 843. The plaintiff in that case rented four rooms over which defendant who was the landlord retained no control. By the same contract apparently by which the premises were leased plaintiff was employed to keep the hall lamps in the building in order and was allowed a certain sum per month for performing these ser vices. Plaintiff took the lamps into one of her own rooms for the purpose of cleaning and filling them, and while engaged in this work a portion of the ceiling fell and injured her. She sought to hold the landlord responsible for these injuries on the ground that as her employer he had failed to furnish her a safe place to work. Recovery is denied on the ground that the landlord did not furnish plaintiff's rooms as a place to work in, but that she rented the rooms on her own account and while occupying them even for the purpose of performing service for the landlord, her status was that of a tenant. MINES AND MINERALS. (Surface Support.) W. Va. — A case of unusual interest and one in which the average mind feels inclined to take issue with the decision of the majority and to agree with

the dissenting judge is that of Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 53 S. E. Rep. 24. In this case it was held that a deed conveying the coal under a tract of land, together with the right to enter upon and under said land, and to mine and excavate and re move all of it, without a reservation that the grantee must leave coal enough to support the surface in its original position, conferred the right on the grantee to remove all of the coal even though by so doing it removed the support of the surface and thereby caused it to fall. The court fortifies its position by holding that deeds con veying coal with rights of removal should be con strued in the same way as other written instruments, and that the intention of the parties as manifested by the language used in the deed itself should govern; and also by announcing as a proposition of law that a deed conveying coal under land with a right to enter the same and remove all of it does not impliedly reserve sub jacent support to the surface. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Poffenbarger points out that the majority opinion avowedly disproves and repudiates the principles of law of subjacent and lateral support declared by every American court that has ever applied that law to a deed or contract by which the surface of land has been separated entirely from the underlying coal, as well as the decisions of the English courts. He reviews at length the decisions of the English courts and of several American courts, and shows that the decision of the majority is at variance with the principles of law announced by the courts reviewed on this subject. He repudiates the an nounced doctrine that a conveyance of coal to gether with the right to mine and remove it does not reserve the right of subjacent support to the grantor retaining the surface; and in this as well in his other contentions, he appears to be sup ported by the unquestioned weight of authority. An interesting side light is thrown on this case by the decisions dealing with ways of necessity. Where a grantor conveys away all of his land except a piece from which he has no way out except over the granted land the law implies a grant back to him from his grantee of a way of necessity, i Tiffany Real Property, p. 714 & cas. cit. even though the grantor gives a deed containing gen eral covenants of warranty. Brigham v. Smith, 4 Gray (Mass.) 297. This doctrine is a recognized exception to the general rule that in construing deeds the intention of the parties as manifested by language used in the deed itself should govern. The exception exists because public policy demands such an implied regrant despite the general words of warranty in the deed. Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287, 291.