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THE GREEN BAG

of losing their jobs, supposes a time when the unions "by a combination of those in different trades and occupations would have complete and absolute control of all the industries of the country," and hence con cludes that the purpose of the unions is unlawful. But in the familiar case of Com monwealth v. Hunt (4 Met. in), which was an indictment for conspiracy against the members of a trade union, alleging that, by combining and agreeing among themselves not to work for an employer who should employ non-members, they compelled the employer to discharge a non-union man, that they conspired to impoverish the latter, and to prevent him from following his trade and conspired to impoverish the employer, Chief Justice Shaw, in giving judgment for the defendant, answered the argument as to compulsion by saying that ' ' whatever might be the force of the word ' compel ' unex plained by its connection, it is disarmed and rendered harmless by the precise state ment of the means by which such compul sion was to be effected" (page 133); and, referring to the "manifest intent of the association to induce all those engaged in the same occupation to become members of it" said that "such a purpose is not un lawful" (page 129). In short, the ground of the decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt is that the conduct of a trade union in demand ing exclusive employment is the exercise of ordinary competitive rights and is not rendered unlawful by the injury thereby inflicted on others or by the attempt to extend the system so as to bring the whole body of workmen within it. It should not be overlooked that monopoly, as applied to the employment of labor, differs from monopoly as applied to the purchase and sale of goods. For it may be considered that the public have some rights in regard to the possession and use of commodities, especially the neces saries of life, which limit in a way the right of private ownership therein, but no man has a claim on the services of another; the

right of the individual to give or withhold the labor of his hands is absolute and it may be said, therefore, that the organized re fusal of however large a body of workmen to work at all or to work except on certain terms cannot be complained of in a court of law. The dissenting opinion of Vann in Jacobs v. Cohen, supra, attacks some minor provi sions of the contract for a union shop there in question, including provisions against overtime work, requiring the employer to allow representatives of the union to act as inspectors to see that the contract is not violated, and permitting sympathetic strikes. It is said that the employer is thus subjected to arbitrary domination in the conduct of his business. But does the law prevent the parties from agreeing to what is thus called arbitrary domination? That cannot be, unless on some theory which requires the workman to himself remain subject to arbitrary domination and de prives him of the right of free contract. The idea behind all such argument evidently is that the workman must not get the upper hand in bargaining with the employer and that, if he does, the law will step in and pro tect the latter by depriving the former of the benefit of his bargain. The weakness displayed in this part of the argument fur nishes a good reason for distrusting the conclusion reached on the main question. Competitive rights on the part of the work man seem to be recognized only so far as they are exercised in a harmless and inoffen sive way. When the law concedes to laborers the right to combine, it is to enable them to make a contest on something like equal terms with employers; it recognizes that to require them to deal separately with the employer would be the height of injustice, and would deprive them of the only means by which they can escape from practical serfdom. The right to organize carries with it the right to render the organization effec tive by excluding disintegrating influences.