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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES same, but failed to turn over the proceeds to plain tiff. Under these circumstances it is held that the company is not liable for the money collected by the messenger, in the absence of any showing that the company was negligent in selecting the messenger. It is also determined that the com pany did not become a common carrier and in surer of the bill and money. NEGLIGENCE. (Mental Suffering — Tele grams.) Tex. — The Texas Court of Civil Ap peals, in Western Union Telegraph Company v. Shaw, 90 Southwestern Reporter, 58, which was an action for mental anguish suffered by a mother, by reason of the telegraph company's failure to deliver a message announcing the death of plain tiff's son in time to permit her to attend the funeral, holds that the plaintiff was not guilty of misconduct in appearing on the witness stand in deep mourning, or in giving way to her emotions during her examination in chief, when she was asked concerning the death and burial of her son. It was also held that the defendant telegraph company, having negligently failed to promptly deliver the message and thereby causing mental suffering to the addressee, was liable for damages for such suffering, though she would have suffered other anguish if the telegram had been delivered promptly so as to enable her to be present at the funeral. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS. Tenn. — A rather peculiar system of therapeutics which, however, the court holds to be a practising of medicine, is revealed in O'Neil v. State, 90 S. W. Rep. 627. Defendant, who was convicted of practising medicine and surgery without a license, diagnosed his patient's diseases by microscopic examination of a drop of blood, and treated them by placing them under the rays of electric arc lights, and also incidentally prescribed certain medicines, for which prescription, however, he made no charge. This is regarded by the court as the practising of medicine within the meaning of Tennessee Statutes, relative to that subject, and it is also held that defendant was not an optician within the meaning of the statute excepting opticians from the provisions of the gen eral statute as to licensing persons practising medicine. PROPERTY. (Adverse Possession.) la. —A point which the court says is in record with the unbroken voice of authority but nevertheless is of sufficiently rare occurrence to justify giving it notice, is contained in Garst v. Brutsche, 105 N. W. Rep. 452, where it is declared that where a person

executed a deed which by mistake conveyed cer tain land not intended to be conveyed, and after the deed was recorded, paid taxes on such land, and fenced it so as to include it with an adjoining and larger field, this did not constitute an adverse possession which would entitle the grantor to hold the land either as against the grantee or a subse quent purchaser from him. . The mere fact that a grantor remains in possession after the execu tion and delivery of a deed is held not to be suffi cient to ultimately give him title unless he disclaims holding for the grantee and openly asserts his own title in hostility to the title claimed under his previous deed. In support of the holding, the court cites Ivey v. Beddingfield (Ala.) 18 So. Rep. 139; Evans v. Templeton (Tex.) 6 S. W. 843; Hen nessey v. Andrews, 6 Cush. 170; Paldi v. Paldi (Mich.) 47 N. W. 510. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS. (Re ligious Instruction.) N. Y. — O'Connor v. Hendrick, 96 New York Supplement, 161, Appellate Division 4th Dept. involves a rather novel point. The laws of New York provide that the super intendent of public instruction shall visit the common schools and advise the teachers and officers, and require him to make to the legisla ture an annual report, containing plans for the improvement of schools. He is also authorized to remove from office any school officer disobeying any regulation adopted by him, and to transmit to school officers information deemed to be con ducive to the proper management of the schools. With these powers it is held that the superin tendent has authority to direct that the garb worn by a religious order shall not be worn by the teachers of the public schools, and that the super intendent has power to dismiss a teacher who re fuses upon his order to discard such distinctive clothing. It also appeared in this case that a teacher in a public school wore the garb of a Catholic religious order to which she belonged and that immediately before the regular time for opening the school, and at the close of the morning and afternoon sessions, she said the prayers of the Catholic Church. The Catholic children were required to be present at the prayers, while the non-Catholic were allowed to be absent. Held to constitute religious teaching within Const, art 9, § 14, prohibiting the state or any subdivision thereof from giving aid to any school under the control of any religious denomination. It is not quite clear from the opinion whether the decision proceeds upon the ground that the appearance of a teacher in the public schools in a sectarian garb constitutes sectarian teaching