Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 18.pdf/341

314 that portion of which the plaintiff was tenant, were ordered to be taken down. At the time the order for demolition was made the lessor's interest in the premises had been assigned and the assig nees in pulling down the building did it in such a manner as to expose the plaintiff's premises, thereby forcing him to leave. The court held that the lessor by the covenant was bound for any act of interruption by himself or by any person whom he had expressly or impliedly authorized to do the acts; and that, if the lessor had parted with the property or adjoining property to a person who could rightfully claim that under his title from the lessor he was authorized to do those acts, the lessor would still be responsible. Thus the landlord had been held responsible to a tenant under a similar covenant for noise and vibration caused by dancing where he had authorized an other tenant to use his rooms for dancing, when he well knew that the dancing caused a nuisance. (Jenkins v. Jackson (1888), 5 Q.B.D. 602); so a landlord had been held responsible to a tenant be cause his tenant of adjoining land had in the proper use of certain drains damaged the complaining tenant, but he was not held responsible for an im proper use of the drains (Sanderson v. Berwickupon-Tweed Corporation, L.R. 13 Q.B.D. 547). The court held that the parties to the lease could not have contemplated that the lessor was to be responsible for wrongful or negligent acts of his assignee which he had not authorized. LIMITATION'OF ACTIONS. (Liability of Stock holders — National Bank.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — A recent decision of the Supreme Court which has attracted considerable general attention is that of Rankin v. Barton, 26 Supreme Court Reporter, ag, where it is held that a state statute of limita tions does not begin to run against the right to -enforce the individual liability of stockholders in a national bank until the amount of such liabil ity has been ascertained and assessed by the Comp troller of the Currency. It is pointed out that a national bank is an instrumentality of the United States, its circulating notes being guaranteed by the United States, so that if the United States should be compelled to pay them, it has a para mount lien on the assets of the bank for reimburse ment. The administration of the bank's assets is therefore vested in the Comptroller of the Cur rency, as an officer of the United States. The individual liability of a stockholder can only be enforced by his order. Consequently a right of action against] the stockholder .does not accrue until the Comptroller of the Currency has deter mined the extent of the liability.

MANDAMUS. (Supervision of Official Action.) Ill. — The limitations necessarily inherent in the nature of a writ of mandamus are illustrated in People ex rel. Bartlett v. Dunne, 76 N.E. Rep. 570. It is there held that a duty to be enforce able by mandamus must be specific in its nature and of such a character that the court may pre scribe the performance of a definite act or series of acts, and though such duty need not be sus ceptible of performance by a single act, but may require the doing of a succession of acts, if they are such that the court can supervise their accom plishment, yet the writ will not lie where the issu ance would compel the court to control and regu late a general course of official conduct, and en force the performance generally of official duties, as, for instance, to remedy neglect by the mayor of a large city to enforce the laws and ordinances providing for Sunday closing of the seven thou sand saloons of such city. MASTER AND SERVANT. (Fellow Servants.) La. — A rather noteworthy holding on the labor question and one for which the court cites no pre cedent is contained in Farmer v. Kearney, 39 So. Rep. 967, where the court declares that responsibility of contractors for injury received by workmen rests upon their freedom of action in respect to selection of and superintendence over the latter, so it is said that when the individual workmen, instead of allowing matters to take their usual shape and course, make it a condition of their accepting service that the contractor will yield in their favor this right of freedom of action, they absolve him from the responsibility which otherwise would be thrown upon him, and look to that of their own selected agencies. Thus, when the workmen delegate to a labor organization which they have joined, and others in privity with it, this right of selection and superintend ence, they agree so far as the contract is con cerned, to accept the membership of their fellowworkmen in their respective organizations, and the action of those associations is ipso facto, good and sufficient guaranty to them for their individ ual safety and protection. MASTER AND SERVANT. (Messengers.l Mass. — A case for which there seems to be no direct precedent is that of Haskell v. Boston Dist. Messenger Co., 76 Northeastern Reporter, 215. The Messenger company furnished a messenger to plaintiff, which messenger was not during the time of his employment by plaintiff under the control of the company. The plaintiff intrusted a bill for rent to the messenger, who collected the