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Rh unfortunately proceeds in such a way as to convey the impression that the rule admitting parol evidence in such cases does not extend to deeds that purport clearly and without ambiguity to convey a fee simple. We cannot believe that the courts and the Bar of South Dakota will permit this unfortunate dictum to draw that state out of line with the vast weight of authority. F. J.

INJUNCTION. (Criminal Prosecution.) Cal. — In Sullivan v. San Francisco Gas & Elec tric Co., 83 Pac. Rep. 156, it is held that injunc tion will not lie to restrain the prosecution of house movers for violating Cal. Pen. Code, impos ing a penalty on every person who unlawfully and maliciously removes or obstructs any electric line. The mere allegation that plaintiffs were not guilty of any such violation is held not sufficient to give a court of equity jurisdiction. It is admitted that courts of equity will in proper cases enjoin the attempt to enforce a law or ordinance making certain acts a criminal offense and imposing a punishment therefor, where the law or ordinance is invalid and its enforcement will injure the plain tiff's property or property rights; but it is pointed out that every person is subject to being prose cuted for some offense of which he is not guilty and that if this is done without reasonable or prob able cause, he has his remedy by action for malicious prosecution. There is, however, no rule which permits a person to substitute a court of equity for the courts of law in the decision of matters of fact relative to criminal prosecutions, and by anticipatory action to take from the regularly constituted criminal courts their jurisdiction of criminal offenses. INJUNCTION. (Boycott — Injury to Business.) H. J. — Van Der Plaat v. Undertakers' & Livery men's Association of Passaic County, 62 Atl. Rep. 453, indicates that though injunction may be re sorted to to prevent a suitor being forced out of an established business, it cannot be resorted to to enable him to force himself in. Complainant alleged that he was educated as an embalmer and undertaker, and that he desired to engage in that business in a certain city, but had been prevented from doing so by the defendant association and its members. It was not alleged that he owned any appliances necessary or convenient for the transaction of the business, but he averred that he relied on purchasing coffins and other supplies of that kind from persons engaged in the business of furnishing such supplies, and on hiring hearses carriages, and horses, etc., for funeral purposes from persons engaged in keeping those articles

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for hire for such purposes. It was alleged that the defendant association included all the under takers in the county and most of the livery stable men; that plaintiff had applied for membership and had been refused, and that dealers in coffins had also refused to sell him such articles, and that keepers of livery stables had refused to furnish him with horses, hearses, and carriages, except at a higher price than that charged the members of the defendant association. Under these facts, it is held that complainant was not entitled to an injunction, inasmuch as he had no established business which the injunctive process could be used to protect. INSURANCE. (Life Policy — Incontestabil ity.) Mass. — Reagan v. Union Mutual Life Instirance Co., 76 Northeastern Reporter, 217, declares that a provision in a life insurance policy, making it incontestable for fraud after the expira tion of a specified time, is binding on the insurer, but that a provision making it incontestable for fraud from the date of the policy, is invalid, so that the insurer in an action on the policy may rely on fraudulent representations prior to the issuance of the policy, notwithstanding that by the terms of the policy the entire contract is con tained in it and the application. In support of the holding, the court cites Massachusetts Ben. Life Association v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 256, 30 E. S. 918; Welch v. Union Cent. Ins. Co., 108 Iowa, 224, 78 N. W. 853; Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139, 18 Sup. Ct. 300; Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550; Burt v. Union Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362, 23 Sup. Ct. 139; and Patter son v. Natural Premium Life Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 118, 75 N. W. 980. LANDLORD AND TENANT. (Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment — Wrongful and Negligent Acts not Authorized by Lessor.) 75 L. J., K. B. 174, Eng. — In this case the plaintiff sued the per sonal representatives of his deceased landlord for damages for breach of a covenant for quiet en joyment contained in a lease for twenty-one years. The covenant entered into by the lessor with the plaintiff (the lessee) was that the lessor should " peaceably enjoy the demised premises" during the term " without any interruption or disturbance by the lessor or any person claiming under him." It appeared that the demised premises consisted of the ground floor of a flat building, and that proceedings had been taken by the sanitary authorities against the lessor because of the condition of the building, the result of which was that all parts of the structure, except