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 THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY technical and narrow. Some men of ex traordinary ability have risen superior to the tendency, but they have been the exceptions; and the existence of this practice in the Appellate Court has led to the devel opment of a type of judge in the court of first instance, who tries a case not so much with the view of rendering a just judgment, but of rendering one which will not be reversed on appeal. This disposi tion on the part of the Trial Court is just as belittling as that practice in the Appel late Court to which reference has been made. In an investigation which was made some two years ago, into the causes of the delay which prevailed in the administration of justice in New York courts, a curious table was prepared and published by the Cornmi sion to whom the matter was referred by the legislature, giving the percentages of reversals on appeal of the judgments delivered by different judges of the trial courts. This disclosed what might natu rally be expected, that the ablest judges, whose judgments on the whole commanded the most respect, were not those who had the smallest percentage of reversals. In short, the tendency of this practice is to turn the administration of justice into a game, in which the keen and crafty on the whole have the advantage. This defect in civil administration, has been very much aggravated by the facility of appeals in criminal cases.' At common law and in the federal system, until recently, there was no right of appeal in criminal cases. The facilities which present legislation has given for such appeals and the technical rules which have come to be generally applied in the administration of criminal justice, have still further developed the technical tendency generated by the ad ministration of civil appeals. A moment's reflection will suggest that it is not all in the interest of the public that the question to be passed upon by an appellate court n criminal appeal, should be whether or

not some technical error has been com mitted in the court of first instance, but whether or not the culprit is guilty. The law which allowed appeals in crimi nal cases to the Supreme Court of the United States has been a great detriment to that court. It has thrown upon it avolume of business which it could ill afford the time and thought to transact. The' very fact of this pressure of business hasled the court inevitably to restrict appeals in civil cases. Certioraris to review judg ments of the Circuit Court of Appeals are very seldom granted; and in writs of error to the state courts, the practice has sprung up of dismissing them when there was the slightest color for saying that a question of fact existed in the case. For example, when the pressure of busi ness was less than it now is, the Supreme Court in Belden v. Chase (150 U. S. 674) heard a collision case upon the merits, al though there were questions of fact which, had been litigated in the court below. But latterly this practice has been changed, and in the Hamburg American Packet Co. v. Lennan (194 U. S. 628) a writ of error in a similar case was dismissed, although there were exceptions in the record quite as well entitled to consideration as those which were considered in Belden v. Chase. Moreover, the existence of this right of review in criminal cases has led to suing out writs of error to review the judgment of the state court in criminal cases. Where there was no just pretext for the writ, it was sued out obviously solely for the pur pose of delay. Such methods bring the whole administration of justice into con tempt, and have much to do with the lynchings which are such a disgrace to American civilization. We believe that if the right of review in criminal cases were greatly limited, and if in all cases of appeal, whether criminal or civil, the Appellate Court- were required to render final judgment upon the merits, irre spective of any errors or mistakes in the