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THE GREEN BAG

but beyond this the analogy ceases. The extraordi nary liability of the carrier of passengers does not arise out of the nature of the calling, but rather out of the high regard for human life. Due care is care commensurate with the circumstances. One of the determining circumstances is that human life and safety are involved, and when such is the case, more diligence and circumspection is exacted than in other situations. The confu sion as to the origin of the carrier's extraordinary liability is attributable, in part, at least, to the classification of care into degrees' (Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 474). The court in the principal case accepts the theory announced in Griffin v. Manice, 166 N. Y. r97> 59 N. E. 925, where the right to ride hi an elevator is held to be based on the implied invita tion by the owner extended to all persons having business on the premises. The owner's duty is the same as that owed to an invited business visitor, which is to use reasonable care and prudence to keep the premises in a safe condition. The criti cism of this is that it takes a rule which is applicable to a condition of premises, a passive situation, and applies it to a situation where the injury arises, not from any defect in the premises in their passive state but from negligence in respect to a moving situation (Gallagher v. Humphrey, 6 L.T. Rep. n.s. 664). E. A. Gilmore. COMMERCE. (Federal Regulation — Discrim ination.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — The legal aspect of a case which had attracted considerable attention is contained in New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Interstate Commerce Com mission, 26 Supreme Court Reporter, 272. The United States Supreme Court here determines that an interstate carrier not empowered by its charter or any legislation existing at the time of the adop tion of the act to regulate commerce, to mine and market coal, violates the mandate of that act re specting the maintenance of published rates and its prohibition against undue preferences and dis criminations by stipulating to sell and transport coal at an agreed price which is insufficient to yield its published freight rates after deducting the cost of purchase and delivery. It was also held that prohibitions of the commerce act as to re bates, favoritism, and discrimination having been construed by the interstate commerce commission to be inapplicable to freight rates for coal charged by interstate carriers empowered to mine and market coal by their charter, or by legislation ex isting at the time of the adoption of that act, this construction having long obtained in practical execution and been impliedly sanctioned by the

reenactment of the statute without alteration in the particulars mentioned, must be treated as read into the statute. CONFLICTS OF LAW. (Domicile — Divorce.) Eng. — Few cases have attracted more attention in England than Armitage v. Attorney-General (Gillig cited), Times Law Reports, February 11, 1906, Eng., in which the president of the divorce division of the High Court of Justice was asked to make a declaration of the legitimacy of the chil dren of a petitioner whose wife had married, rely ing upon a decree of divorce obtained in South Dakota. According to the opening statement of petitioner's counsel Mrs. Armitage was an English woman by birth, and in 1883 she married, in Eng land, Charles A. Gillig, an American citizen, who had come to England when seventeen years old and who was residing and had been carrying on busi ness in England for some years. There were two children of the marriage. Differences occurred be tween the parties, and in 1886 a separation deed was entered into in England. In 1889 Mrs. Gillig qualified herself as a teacher of cooking and having obtained a diploma proceeded to Yankton, South Dakota, where she took a house and furnished it. After three months' residence there she instituted divorce proceedings against her husband on the ground of desertion. The defend ant, who was personally served in England, entered an appearance, pleaded to the jurisdiction and the merits of the claim, and filed a cross-bill. In his answer he stated that he was a citizen of the United States temporarily residing in England. He called no evidence and Mrs. Gillig obtained her decree by default. She then left South Da kota, and seven months afterwards married Mr. Armitage, an Englishman whom she had known before she left England. The parties have since lived together in England. Mr. Gillig also married again, and unhappy differences having again arisen between him and his wife, he filed his peti tion in the English court for a declaration of the nullity of his second marriage on the ground that the South Dakota divorce was invalid. Mr. Annitage then instituted the present proceedings for a declaration of the legitimacy of the children born of his marriage with the former Mrs. Gillig. No evidence was called by the attorney-general or Mr. Gillig. Mrs. Armitage testified that when she departed from England to go to South Dakota she had no intention of returning and that she had taken up her residence in good faith in that State. She also stated that Mr. Gillig had retained his domicile of birth in New York. The president in the course of his judgment said that the question