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THE GREEN BAG

names of the cases alone fill a hundred and fifty pages more. The subject is a very broad one, and it has been treated in many ways, and this book has a place of its own and will be of distinct service to the profession. E. Q. K. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Contracts. In) the March American Law Review (V. xl, p. 175), " The Dartmouth College Paralogism" is discussed by William Trickett. He analyzes and criticises Marshall's famous decision, showing that the charter was a grant and not a contract that if there were a contract it must have been between the English parlia ment and the individuals named in the charter; that a sovereign cannot create an obligation irrevocably binding on itself, and that there fore there was no obligation to such supposed contract which the Constitution could pro tect, even admitting that the state of New Hampshire succeeded to such obligation. He reminds us that the decision was speedily made non-effective by the passage of general laws making future charters subject to amend ment, and insists that there is no difference between a charter which by its terms or by general laws is subject to amendment, and one which is impliedly so, such as the charter granted by parliament. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Treaties). United States Senator A. A. Bacon, of Georgia, contributes to the April North American Re view an article on the treaty-making powers of the Senate. In the main he holds the view that the Senate is entitled to advise with the President in making treaties. It is not always necessary that the Senate insist on coopera tion before a treaty is drafted, but in his judgment the Senate cannot be regarded as guilty of intrusion upon the presidential func tions and prerogatives if at any time it should call upon the President for information as to a treaty which may be in progress of negotia tion. In conclusion he says : "It is a salutary practice for the President to be advised by the Senate whether there should or should not be an attempt to make a treaty, or to interfere in any manner with the affairs of other nations. There are senators who have been in office for a generation and

whose advice and counsel would be valuable to any. President, however learned and able and patriotic he might be. It has rarely hap pened that a President is superior, in either natural or acquired ability, to the average ability of the Senate. It has frequently hap pened that the President chosen has been with out any experience in national public affairs. There may be at some time in the future an impulsive and strong-willed or even, possibly, a weak President. An election to the presi dency does not ipso facto endow one with all knowledge and all wisdom; and it is not an unreasonable suggestion that, in the aggre gate of ninety senators, many of them men of great capacity and of large experience, there is more of knowledge of public affairs, more of conservatism, more of correct judgment of the requirements of the public interests, than is possessed by any one man in the United States, whoever he may be." CONTRACTS. " Contracts — Impossibility of Performance," by N. S. Natesau, Calcutta Law Journal (V. iii, p. 39 n.). CONTRACTS. " Restraint of Trade," by E. J. Blake, Bombay Law Reporter (V. viii, p. 76)'_ CONTRACTS (Guaranty). " Demand on Principal before Action against Guarantor" is discussed by William P. Rogers in the April Columbia Law Review (V. vi, p. 229). It is frequently stated that such a demand is neces sary, but a demand as a rule is required only to place the party upon whom it is made in default. If he is already in default there is no necessity for it. It is not disputed that where a demand is required in ordinary contracts to put the opposite party in default, under similar conditions in contracts of guarantee, a demand must be made on the principal and notice given to the guarantor as a condition precedent to action on the contract of guaranty, but the converse proposition that demand on the principal will not be required except in those cases where generally a de mand is necessary to place the other party to the contract in default while apparently logical is disputed in many jurisdictions. COPYRIGHT. Acland Giles contributes to the January Commonwealth Law Review (V.