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eral sense of the commercial world during a number of centuries, and tend to destroy that uniformity of the general maritime law, which is so important in commercial affairs." ADMIRALTY (Seamen, Personal Injuries). In the April Harvard Law Review (V. xix, p. 14) Fitzhenry Smith, Jr., analyzes the cases re lating to " Liability in the Admiralty for Injury to Seamen." "The conclusions reached may be summed up as follows: "(i) That in the case of an injury by acci dent the seaman is entitled to no indemnity. "(2) That in the case of an injury resulting from negligence there is likewise no right to an indemnity, unless the act or acts of negligence constitute a breach of some contractual duty. "(3) That in the case of an intentional in jury no indemnity can be recovered, unless the wrong also amounts to a breach of a con tractual duty or unless the offender was at the time acting as the agent of the owner and within the scope of his employment. "(4) If <wy injury happen while the seaman is in the ' service of the ship,' he is entitled to maintenance and cure, to his wages and a passage back to the port of shipment, or the cost of the same — in the absence of wilful misconduct upon his own part. "(5) If an intentional injury is a breach of the shipping contract, the ship, in America, is liable in rem. "These statements, we believe, represent the law. The questions to be settled include the enumeration and definition of the implied obligations of the shipping contract (especially with respect to the treatment due the mariner), the delimitation of the duration of the dis abled mariner's right to cure and maintenance, and of the period during which he is entitled to wages, and a decision as to the adaptability to the admiralty of the fellow-servant doc trine." AGENCY. In the April Michigan Law Re view (V. vi, p. 433), Floyd R. Mechem pub lishes an advance chapter from his forth coming book on agency, entitled " The Nature and Extent of an Agent's Authority." He summarizes his views as to what constitutes authority as follows: "Putting all of these principles together,

it will be seen that the authority of the agent, so far as it concerns the rights of third persons, may be a composite matter made up of a number of elements. It consists: "First, and primarily, of the powers directly and intentionally conferred by the voluntary act of the principal. "Second, of those incidental powers which are reasonably necessary and proper to carry into effect the main powers conferred and which are not known to be prohibited. "Third, of those powers which usage and cus tom have added to the main powers, and which the parties are to be deemed to have had in contemplation at the time of the creation of the agency, and which are not known to have been forbidden. "Fourth, of all such other powers as the prin cipal has, by his direct act or by negligent omission or acquiescence, caused or permitted persons dealing with the agent reasonably to believe that the principal had conferred. "Fifth, of all those other powers whose exer cise by the agent, the principal has subse quently, with full knowledge of the facts, ratified and confirmed. "For the acts done in pursuance of those powers which were directly conferred or which were incidental to those powers and not pro hibited, the principal is of course responsible, because they are the direct result of his volun tary and intentional act. He is likewise re sponsible, and for the same reasons, for those acts which he has intentionally led third per sons to believe that he had authorized. He is responsible for the acts of the agent which he has, by negligent omission or acquiescence, led the persons dealing with the agent to be lieve he has authorized, because to deny them would be a fraud upon innocent persons. He is responsible for those acts which he has sub sequently ratified and confirmed, upon the ground that such a ratification is equivalent to a precedent authority. "As between the agent and the principal theauthority would consist of the same elements as in the case of third persons, with the excep tion that the forbidden powers and secret limitations which would not affect third per sons who were ignorant of them, bind the agent who must necessarily have knowledge of them."