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 THE GREEN BAG This is an individualistic code. It is the code of the man who mistrusts centralized government, of the man who is no believer in a bureaucracy, of the man who desires to place obstacles in the way of govern mental inspection and of governmental pa ternalism, of the man who cherishes a love of privacy. It is in line with the high garden wall so characteristic of the English home, of the Calvinistic political ideal which up held the individual, and which even in its political collectivism refused to go beyond the local industrial center or the local church organization. It does not say that no entry by force can be made until reason able means have been adopted to enter peaceably, but that, except in certain cases, no entry can be made at all. Side by side with the growth of this rule, but based perhaps on more altruistic ideals, is the rule that no man shall be compelled to incriminate himself.1 The history of the rule is ably set forth by Prof. Wigmore in his monumental work on "The Law of Evidence."2 It was never insisted upon in the common law courts until after the English revolution. A contrary practice prevailed in Massachusetts as late as the year 1685. "The privilege," to use the lan guage of Prof. Wigmore, "creeping in thus by indirection, appears by no means to have been regarded as the constitutional landmark that our later legislation has made it. In the parliamentary remonstrances and petitions and declarations that preceded the expulsion of the Stuarts, it does not appear at all. Even by 1688, when the courts had for a decade ceased to question it, and at the revolution the fundamental victories of the past two generations' struggle were ratified by William in the Bill of Rights, this doctrine is totally lacking. Whatever it was worth to the constitutionmakers of 1789, it was not worth mention ing to the constitution-menders of 1688. 1 Am'ts. U. S. Const. Art. 5. 1 Wigmore on Ev., Vol. Ill, chap. 78.

It is a little singular that the later body, who had themselves suffered nothing in this respect, and could herein aim merely to copy the lessons which their forefathers of a century ago had handed down as taught by their own experience, should have incor porated a principle which those forefathers themselves, fresh from that experience, had never thought to register among the funda mentals of just procedure." ' The tendency of to-day, however, is de cidedly towards collectivism, both indus trially and socially; and in accordance with this trend of movement, we have by legis lative enactment authorized not merely the issuance of search warrants in numerous cases that could hardly have been contem plated by the common law, but in many instances searches and invasions of the right of privacy without the formality of any warrant at all. Searches and seizures with warrants have been authorized for the purpose of searching for gambling instru ments and devices, for counterfeiting tools, for lottery tickets, for intoxicating liquors supposed to be kept for sale in violation of the law, for obscene books and papers, for dangerous explosives, for books and papers of a public character which have been taken from their proper custody, for females secreted in houses of ill fame, for children kept from their parents or guardians, for concealed weapons, for counterfeit money, and for forged bills and papers.1 The valid ity of these statutes has been generally upheld. In speaking of them, the Supreme Court of Iowa has said that "no search warrant is unreasonable in the legal sense, when it is for a thing obnoxious to the law and of a person or place particularly de scribed, and is issued on oath of probable cause."8 And this statement is perhaps historically correct. The searching for smuggled goods would perhaps hardly have 1 Wigmore on Ev., Vol. Ill, p. 3090. 1 Cooley, Const. Lim.,;th ed. p. 432. 1 Santo v. State, a la. 165, 63 Am. Decs. 4.87.