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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES the railroad company for delay in the delivery of the valise and also for damage to the property. The suit was settled and plaintiff received a sum of money in satisfaction of the damages. After wards plaintiff commenced another action for mental anguish caused by the injury to the clothing. This action, it was held, was not main tainable, it being the opinion of the court that plaintiff should have collected in the first action all that she was entitled to recover, and not having done so, was precluded from afterward claiming any further damages. In its search for authorities the court goes back to Fetter v. Beal, i Salk. n, where plaintiff recov ered damages for an assault and battery by which his skull was broken and afterwards, upon the falling out of a piece of his skull, brought an action for additional damages. The right to recover additional damages was denied, Lord Holt saying that the injury which was the foundation of the action was the battery, and the greatness or conse quence of that was only an aggravation of damages, so that whatever damage might probably have ensued should have been given in evidence in the first action. This principle is regarded as govern ing the case at hand and the plaintiff's right to recover is held to have been merged in the former recovery. In the language of the court, " She could carve out as large a slice as the law allowed but she could cut but once."

LICENSES. (Transient Merchants.) la. — Iowa Code. S 700. giving cities and towns power to define by ordinance who shall be considered transient merchants, is construed in State ex rel. Town of Sigourney v. Nelson, 105 N. W. Rep. 327, as only giving the town authority to determine what merchants shall be considered as transient and not as empowering it to declare persons to be mer chants who, by universal acceptance in the business world, are not such. Consequently, it is held that one employed as a traveling salesman, who received a stated salary and expenses, displayed samples and solicited orders from consumers, which he sent to his employers, who shipped the goods to the purchasers, was not a merchant within a city ordinance, requiring a transient merchant to take out a license. " Such person." says the court, " is merely a medium through which a merchant communicates with his customers; what is accomplished being no more than if the merchant had made use of the mails or telephone to solicit orders and of an express or transfer company to make deliveries." LICENSES (see Torts, Injunctions^.

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MARRIAGE. (Common-Law Marriage.) Tenn. —Under the decision in Smith v. North Memphis Savings Bank, 89 Southwestern Reporter, 392, there can be no common -law marriage in Tennessee. The court holds that the common law, as a dis tinctive system of laws, was never adopted in its entirety, nor was it in force in Tennessee, but only such part thereof was in force there as was a part of the law of North Carolina when the territory of Tennessee was ceded by that state to the federal government. It naturally follows that the statu tory provisions of Tennessee, requiring parties proposing to many to first procure a license and make their contract in the presence of certain officers or a minister of the gospel, are mandatory, and preclude recognition of the validity of a com mon-law marriage. This decision is not fraught with quite such serious consequences in the instant case as might be expected, since a supple mental decision declares that where plaintiff and deceased had lived together and recognized each other as husband and wife for more than twenty-five years, deceased, if living, would be estopped from asserting that they had not been legally married, and hence in a proceeding by plaintiff to enforce her marital rights as widow against his estate, it would be presumed, as against his administrator, that they were legally married. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. (Ultra Vires — Municipal Trading.) Eng. — Attorney-General v. Lord Mayor of Manchester in the Chancery Divi sion was a case of great interest to municipal cor porations that carry on undertakings of a character until lately more usually carried on by private corporations or individuals. The action was brought by the attorney-general on the relation of one Thomas Watson trading as Sutton & Com pany against the Corporation of Manchester. The facts showed that the relator was a large rate payer in the defendant's city, and that he carried on business as a carrier and forwarding agent in Manchester and its neighborhood, and the defend ants were the owners, as the local authority for the city of Manchester, of a large system of tram way or street-car lines operated on the trolley system, within and beyond the city, which they had constructed or which had been acquired by or leased by them under various acts of Parliament and provisional orders. It also appeared that the corporation intended to put in operation a large and comprehensive scheme of parcels delivery and collection, or in other words, to do the work of a local express company, in connection with their tramways. As part of this scheme they proposed to accept " cash on delivery " parcels, parcels to be delivered by special messengers at