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THE GREEN BAG

presumption of its correctness, and the courts will not ordinarily review it, although they may have the power, and will occasionally exercise the right of so doing." In other words the Supreme Court does not rec ognize an absolute right to have the independent judgment of a court upon questions of law or fact decided by administrative authorities, but asserts the judicial power to review administrative deter minations in case of clear error or of abuse of authority. E. F. ADMIRALTY. (Wrongful Death — Measure of Damages.) U. S. D. C. for S. D. of N. Y.— Two or three points of some importance are contained in the decision in the Saginaw and the Hamilton, 139 Fed. Rep. 906. It is there held that in en forcing in a court of admiralty a right of action for wrongful death in a collision on the high seas, which right of action is given by the statute of the state to which the vessels belonged, the measure of damages is governed by the law of such state. It is also determined that the first officer of a vessel sunk in a collision is not chargeable with negli gence because of her improper navigation where he acted in all that he did under the orders of the master, and that the fact that such vessel as well as the other was in fault for the collision does not affect such officer or members of the crew so as to preclude the recovery of full damages for their deaths from the fund paid in by the other vessel in proceedings for the limitation of liability. Probably the most novel holding in the case is that to the effect that the mortality tables, prepared for life insurance purposes, afford little aid in de termining the expectancy of life in actions to recover damages for wrongful death, and that this is especially true where the deceased is a colored person. This latter holding is based upon two grounds, the first of which was expressed in the William Branfoot, 48 Fed. 914, where Judge Simonton said, with respect to mortality tables: "I have no confidence in and less respect for these tables, made up by insurance agents, in which, of course, large allowance must be made for heavy commissions, expenses, and profit." The conclu sion that such tables are especially inaccurate as applied to the colored race is reached by con sideration of the mortality tables abstracted from the census of 1880, which tables show that there is a very noticeable difference between the expectancy of life of a white and a colored per son, especially during early maturity, the aver age white person at the age of thirty, for instance, having an expectancy of about three and onehalf years more than a colored person of the same age.

The decision that the damages are governed by the law of the flag where the cause of action arose on the high seas is in accord with principle and authority. And the slight value of mortality tables as evi dence of the 'durability of human life in case of the colored race agrees with the known facts as to their high death rate as compared with the white race, a recognized fact in the sections where the colored population is most numerous. R. M. H. CARRIERS. (Passengers.) Ky. — A decision of great interest to carriers, particularly rail roads, is delivered by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Allen, 89 Southwestern Reporter, 150. The duty of a carrier of passengers is held to be to attend to the comfort and safety of all of its pas sengers alike, but not to furnish especial atten tion to any one in particular, unless under excep tional circumstances, such as sickness en route, though if a carrier voluntarily accepts a helpless passenger without an attendant, it thereby assumes the additional care commensurate with his needs. In view of this duty, it is held that where a blind man seventy-seven years of age frequently took short trips involving no change of cars, or, on taking a trip involving a change of cars, was assisted by chance acquaintances or the employees in charge of the train, the carrier was justified in refusing to sell him a ticket unless he secured an attendant. The case is not entirely without precedent; indeed, the court quotes tosome extent from Illinois Central Railroad Com pany v. Smith, 37 Southern 643, where the Su preme Court of Mississippi says that primarily the affliction of blindness unfits a person from safe traveling by railway, if unaccompanied, so that when a blind person applies to purchase a ticket, the ticket may be refused, unless the agent knows of his personal knowledge that the applicant for the ticket is competent to travel alone. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Due Process of Law.) R. I. — Two related points of considerable local interest are determined in Gunn v. Union Railroad Company, 62 Atlantic Reporter, 118. The scope of the decision is necessarily somewhat limited by the fact that the point of chief impor tance is determined expressly with reference toconditions in Rhode Island. The provisions of the Federal Constitution prohibiting a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection