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THE GREEN BAG

producing the injury does not prevent the plain tiff from pursuing his remedy separately against the defendant for his tort, and it is immaterial that this concurring fault of a third party is that of an infant plaintiff's parents in negligently per mitting their child to be unattended in a place of danger. Under the Connecticut statutes (§§ 398, 399) a judgment obtained in the above action would be equally distributed between the parents. They are therefore permitted to profit from their own negli gence. But if the judgment rendered is regarded as a part of the estate of the deceased person this cannot be a fatal objection since, in some juris dictions, even one who intentionally murders his ancestor is permitted to inherit his estate. Cardenter's Appeal, 170 Pa. 203; Schellenberger v. Ramson, 41 Neb. 641 (overruling 31 Neb. 61); Owens v. Owens, 100 N. Car. 240. The rule is different as to taking under a will (Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 5061 or a life insurance policy (Cleaver v. Mutual, etc., Ass'n, 1892, i O. B. 147). The question in cases like the above is therefore whether the statute makes the right of action a part of the deceased person's estate or whether it creates a right of action for the special benefit of designated beneficiaries. If the latter, beneficiaries who have by their negligence contributed to the death, ought not to be permitted, as the real parties in interest, to profit by their own wrong under the guise of an action by the administrator for their benefit. But in such a case a difficult question is raised when one of several beneficiaries has negligently contrib uted to the death and there Is no provision for separate verdicts for the benefit of each. Wolfe v. Lake Erie, etc., Ry., 55 Oh. St. 517; Air-Line Ry. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369. Under statutes in Iowa, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Vermont, and Vir ginia the contributory negligence of the beneficiary has been held, as in the above case, to be no bar to recovery by the administrator. It has been held to be a bar under statutes in Arkansas, Ala bama, Indiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and there are dicta to the same effect in other states. Of course the question of imputing the negligence of a parent to an infant so as to bar his own recovery in case he should sur vive, and therefore the recovery of the adminis trator after his death, should be kept distinct. E. W. H.

TORTS. (Strike — Inj u nction.) m. — The right of a labor union to declare a strike in order to compel an employer to unionize his business is denied in O'Brien v. People, 75 Northeastern Reporter, 108. It appeared that a manufactur

ing corporation conducting an open shop in which both union and non-union mechanics were em ployed was approached by the agents of a labor union and requested to sign a contract wherein it was agreed that the corporation should employ none but mechanics belonging to the union; that a steward of each craft employed should see that the employees belong to the union and that a business agent of the union should have the privilege of interviewing members of the corpora tion at its offices during business hours. The con tract further provided that all apprentices should belong to the union, that their number should not exceed one for every ten mechanics or less of the different crafts; and that a sympathetic strike so protect union principles should not be contidcred a violation of the contract. The corpo ration refused to sign the agreement, whereupon the agents of the union threatened to and did call a strike. In this situation it was held that the attempt to coerce the corporation into sign ing the contract by threats to order a strike was an unlawful interference with the business of the corporation. It also declared that acts of strikers in coercing, intimidating, and beating the corpo ration's employees was a violation of a strike injunction .sufficient to sustain a judgment for contempt against persons guilty thereof. The end must justify the means. Even in New York which under its judicial decisions is a para dise for those who wish to control the business of others, it has been held that the interference with contracts or business could not be justified if the end sought was to compel the plaintiff to deliver up certain books or papers (Connell v. Stalker, 21 N. Y. Misc. 609); or to join a union (Coons v. Chrystie, 24 N. Y. Misc. 296; Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33); or to employ only union men (Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 N. Y. Misc. 329). But probably some of these sound conclusions are impeached by the reasoning in National Protec tive Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315. To induce employees to strike for higher wages or shorter hours is quite a different matter from inducing them to strike in order to compel their employer to discharge or not to employ such workmen as he may choose to keep or to engage. It is not every remote advantage to A and his associates that •will justify A. in inducing his associates to quit their employment with the plaintiff. Able judges differ as to whether a particular end or object is too remote, for example, the strengthening of the labor union as a preliminary to a contest with the employer about wages. (Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492.) The principal case seems to reject the strengthening of the labor union as a justification for interference with the employer's business. E. W. H.