Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 18.pdf/135

 THE GREEN BAG and in a reasonable manner. It was held that the standard of comfort differs according to the situation of property and the class of people who inhabit the locality, and that a resident in such a neighborhood, such as that in which the plaintiff lived, would have to put up with a certain amount of noise, but that, whatever the standard of com fort in a particular district might be, the annoy ance might be so material as to create a legal nuisance, if the noise was caused by the carrying on of a particular trade not in the particular and established manner of the trade in the district. In other words, it was held that where there was a substantial addition to preexisting noises it is no defense that the neighborhood is a noisy one and that the machinery causing the noise is of the most modern pattern and of first-class charac ter. The following cases were cited: Sturges v. Bridgman, n Ch. D. 852; St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping, n H. L. C. 642; Crump v. Lambert L. R. 3, Eq. 409; Walters. Selfe, 4 De G. & S. 315; Colls v. Home & Colonial Stores, 1904 A. C. 179, 185. The injunction was granted. PRACTICE. (New Trial — Jurisdiction.) Minn. — The case of Xroning v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 104 Northwestern Reporter, 888, contains a very brief decision upon a point of procedure which does not often arise. It is there held that the general grant of appellate jurisdiction in all cases, both in law and equity, to the Supreme Court, carries with it by necessary intcndment every other power reasonably necessary for the com plete exercise in all cases of the jurisdiction con ferred, and gives the court jurisdiction and power to remand a case and the record thereof to the trial court, to enable the appellant to renew a motion for a new trial on the ground of evidence which was newly discovered since the filing of the return in the Supreme Court. PRACTICE. (Peer's Privilege.) Eng. — Students of the history of legal practice will be interested in the arguments of the Committee of Privileges of the House of Lords in the application of Lord Kinross to be permitted to practice before the House of Lords, he being himself a peer. The debate is reported in 1905 Appeal Cases, 468. Lord Kinross is the son of the late Lord Justice General of Scotland, and is a practicing barrister. The only case in which a member of the House of Lords has become a practicing member of the English Bar, was, until very recently, that of the present Lord Coleridge. In in re Kinross the Lord Chancellor moved: " That according to the practice of the highest Court of Appeal, the House of Lords, there is no reason why a peer should not be heard as an advocate to argue questions of

law before your Lordship's House." In his argu ment supporting the motion the Lord Chancellor referred to the heretofore anomalous position of Lord Coleridge, and said that he assumed that there is nothing in the position of an advocate before the courts to prevent a peer from practic ing at the Bar, but that then the question arose, is there anything to exclude him from appearing also before the highest Court of Appeal? He went on to say: " Whatever may be said about that now, there is no doubt that in earlier times there was not a strong partition between the Bench and the Bar. If anything is to be said about the traditions of the Bar, my impression, derived from the old reports, is that in the times of our early legal history a man was one day an advo cate and the next day a judge. In fact, when you use the old reports for the purpose of author ity, it is difficult, without making some sort of antiquarian inquiry, to ascertain whether or not the words you quote are words of authority coming from one of the judges, or whether they are merely the arguments of counsel which may have been altered the day before in his capacity as counsel, and not as a judge at all. From time to time they went from the Bench to the Bar and from the Bar to the Bench during all those years." All of the Lords, except Lord James, supported the Lord Chancellor and the resolution to admit peers to practice, with the amendment that such privilege should not extend to appearing to argue before Committees of the House, or before the House when sitting on a criminal case when a peer is on trial, was unanimously carried. SHIPPING. (Abandonment — Contract of Af freightment.) U. S. S. C. — In The Eliza Lines, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8, it is held that the justifiableabandonment of a vessel in consequence of the dangers of the seas is such a renunciation of the contract of affreightment as entitles the cargo owners to refuse to go on with the voyage, at least, where the master has not rejoined the ship before some one else has taken possession, or has not obtained the vessel and cargo from the salvors before the cargo owners have announced their decision to terminate the contract. The opinion is by Mr. Justice Holmes and proceeds upon the theory that though the master's act in abandon ing the ship was justifiable, it nevertheless was a voluntary act and constituted a rescission of the contract of affreightment. Justices Brown, Harland, McKenna, and Day, dissent and lay down the doctrine that the compulsory abandonment of a ship at sea should be treated merely as a relinquishincnt of the voyage and of any present intention to continue it, but that if the vessel be subsequently rescued and taken into an interme