Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 17.pdf/761

 THE GREEN BAG viso is to give the bankrupt, in a case where such a policy would not be exempt by the state laws, a right, upon paying or securing the cash sur render value of the policy, to continue to retain the same. Besides the main point in issue this case con firms the decisions of the various District Courts to the effect that where a policy of life insurance is payable to the bankrupt, his executors, admin istrators, or assigns, even though it has no cash surrender value, it passes to the trustee in bank ruptcy. Gould v. New York Life Ins. Co., 13 A. B. R. 233. In re Mertens, 12 A. B. R. 712, 131 Fed. 972. In re Welling, 7 A. B. R. 340, 113 Fed. 189. In re Slinglurf, 5 A. B. R. 76, 106 Fed. 154. If nothing can be realized either by the surren der or the sale of the policy there is nothing to pass to the trustee. Gould v. New York Life Ins. Co. Supra and cases there cited. However, a practical difficulty often arises where, as is common, the insurance is for the benefit of a third person named in the policy, although the cash surrender value may be payable to the bank rupt. Such a policy cannot be surrendered with out the consent of the beneficiary. Central Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195. Gould v. Emerson, 99 Mass. 154. Wilburn v. Wilburn, 83 Ind. 55. Ricker v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 27 Minn. 193. Charter Oak Ins. Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo. 419. Pingree v. National Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 374. Therefore, it has recently been decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that if a bank rupt at the time of his bankruptcy holds a life insurance policy providing that, if he dies within twenty years, the company shall pay the amount of the policy to his mother if living, or if she is dead, to his estate, and at the end of twenty years if he survives the company shall pay to him, he has an interest in the policy which passes to his trustee: but the trustee in bankruptcy cannot surrender the policy without the consent of the mother, nor can he compel the insurance com pany to pay him anything for the insurance pol icy without such consent. Haskell v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 181 Mass. 341. If once the trustee elects to abandon an insur ance policy as valueless, if subsequently the bank rupt dies, the trustee has lost all his rights to the proceeds of the policy. Myers v. Josephson, 10 A. B. R. 687. Lee M. Friedman.

BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS. (Members — Indebtedness to Order — Lottery Tickets.) Conn. — A debt is none the less a debt because con tracted for lottery tickets, says the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in Kelly v. Court R. F. Phelan, No. 122, Foresters of America, 60 Atl. Rep. 1022. The by-laws of the defendant beneficial association defined a member in finan cial standing, entitled to share in death benefits, as one who was not indebted to subordinate courts for fines or assessments or anything else that might be charged against him as dues, to an amount equal to six months' dues. Plaintiff's decedent, who was a member of the order, was charged on the books thereof with an indebtedness for unpaid dues in the sum of $3.75, and a further indebtedcncss of $1.00, making a total which was more than equal to six months' dues. The indebtedness of Si.oo arose from the fact that defendant had some time before joined with others in giving a fair, at which there was a drawing, for which tickets were sold entitling the holder to a chance on various prizes. Prior to the fair, these tickets were distributed by defend ant among its members, and a book of some of them was taken by plaintiff's decedent for the purpose of selling the tickets for the benefit of defendant. Neither the tickets nor the money for them was ever returned to defendant, and the one dollar indebtedness was on account of these tickets. The court holds that notwithstanding the fact that the drawing was actually a lottery, the charge against insured for the tickets was a valid indebtedness, so that he was not a member in good standing under the by-laws at the time of his death. CARRIERS. (Rebilling Rate — Discrimination.) Miss. — Quite a learned and extensive consid eration of rebilling rates and their operation and effect is to be found in Alabama in Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Miss., 37 South. Rep. 356. The court lays down the jiile that a true rebilling rate is one in which the goods received in unbroken car-lots over one line of railway can be rebilled over the same or another line, completing one continuous trip, simply changing the consignee and altering the destina tion of the identical shipment without unloading. A so-called rebilling rate, which is not applied to consignments arriving over all connecting lines but is only available to those receiving freight over associated lines and under which freight, where consigned over the rebilling road, does not complete one continuous trip without rehandling, and is not necessarily the identical shipment originally consigned, there being a custom of