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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES

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NOTES OF THE MOST IMPORTANT RECENT CASES COMPILED BY THE EDITORS OF THE NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM AND ANNOTATED BY SPECIALISTS IN THE SEVERAL SUBJECTS (Copies of the pamphlet Reporters containing full reports of any of these decisions may be secured from the West Pubishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, at 25 cents each. In ordering, the title of the desired case should be given as well as the citation of volume and page of the Reporter in which it is printed.)

ATTORNEYS. (Disbarment — Nature of Pro ceeding.) Fla. — An interesting comment upon the nature of disbarment proceedings is con tained in State v. McRae, 38 Southern Reporter, 605. Therein it is maintained that disbarment proceedings are not designed as a penalty .or punishment for any misfeasance or dereliction of duty by an attorney, but are solely for the pur pose of purging the roll of legal practitioners of an unworthy or disreputable member. In such a proceeding, therefore, no fine, imprisonment, or other punitive sentence, can be imposed, but the judgment can be merely one revoking the for merly granted permit to practice law, and strik ing the name of the derelict from the ' roll of attorneys. Upon very much this same ground is based the further holding that a disbarment pro ceeding against an attorney is not a criminal prosecution and does not fall within that class of cases that require the charges to be preferred by information or indictment, or that require a trial by jury, or a confrontation of the accused with the witnesses against him. It is admitted that proceedings to disbar an attorney are, in the absence of statutes, based solely on the inherent power of the courts over their officers, and are intended for the protection of the courts from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice as attorneys. From this it follows that such proceedings are not of a criminal nature, that the statute of limitations is not a defense, that failure to testify on the part of the accused raises against him the presumption of the truth of such uncontradicted facts as must be within his knowledge, that the right of the court to proceed cannot be affected by a private settlement between the attorney and third parties, and that the offense need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but that a clear preponder ance of the evidence is sufficient. The principal case, wjth its additional deductions, is in line with the great majority of decisions that have dealt with this aspect of disbarment proceedings. Ex parte Wall. 107 U. S. 265, is the leading case, and

constitutes almost a text-book by itself, for de cision and dissenting opinion cover more than fifty pages. The contrary view, to be logical, must, among other things, insist upon proof be yond a reasonable doubt, even in cases where the offense constitutes in no sense either a crime or a misdemeanor, and may, conceivably, fall short even of a tort. We know of only one court, and that one of inferior jurisdiction, that has gone this length. W. E. Walz. BANKRUPTCY. (Exemptions — Life Insur ance Policies.) U. S. S. C. — Holden v. Stratton, 25 Supreme Court Reporter, 656, contains an authoritative determination of a question as to which there has been some diversity of opinion. This question is the construction of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act relating to exemptions of life insurance policies. Section 6 of the act pro vides that it shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions prescribed by the state laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition. A proviso contained in section yoa, declares, however, that if any bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a cash sur render value payable to him, his estate, or per sonal representatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascer tained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the distribution of his estate, but that otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets. It has been held In rt Scheld, 44 C. C. A. 233, 104 Fed. 870, that the proviso in section joa. limits the operation of section 6 so that life insurance policies, though exempt by the state laws, are not exempt to the bankrupt if they have a cash surrender value The contrary is held in Steele v. Buel, 44 C. C. A. 287, 104 Fed. 968. The Supreme Court unani mously holds that section 703 deals only with property which is not exempt but passes to the trustee, and that the only operation of the pro