Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 17.pdf/72

 NOTES OF RECENT CASES also held to violate the provisions of the State Constitution to the effect that the protection of the citizen and the enjoyment of life, liberty and property is the sole object of government. This same act was held to be unconstitutional by Judge Jones, of the Federal Court, in the Peonage Cases, reported in 123 Fed. 671. Judge Jones reviews the evils which exist because of the abandonment of contracts to labor at times when such abandon ment works an irreparable loss to the employer, but holds that another statute, providing that a breach of contract which occurs after the employ^ obtains money or personal property from the em ployer, and which is made with the intent to in jure and defraud the employer, and is without just cause, shall subject the offender to the same punishment as if he had stolen the money or property of the employer, unless the same is re funded at the time the contract is terminated, goes as far towards the correction of this evil, as is possible by a criminal enactment, under our form of government. MISCONDUCT OF JUROR. (INDEPENDENT RE SEARCH — EVIDENCE NOT BEFORE THE COURT.) KENTUCKY COURT OP APPEALS. On the trial of the case of Gratz v. Worden, 82 Southwestern Reporter 395, which was an action for personal injuries, a juror who had evidently had experience in that kind of actions before, and was by nature somewhat more skeptical than his associates, determined to satisfy himself as to the extent and nature of plaintiff's injuries at a time when that worthy was not under the incubus of his testimonial oath, and hence followed him dur ing a recess out into the corridors of the court house and satisfied himself in that manner that plaintiff's injury, as evidenced by a halting gait, was real and not feigned. Whereupon he readily united with his brethren in returning the custom arily generous verdict for plaintiff, but committed the indiscretion of afterwards telling defendant's counsel of his exploit. Counsel thereupon drew up an affidavit, rehearsing the facts, and moving for a new trial on the ground of the juror's mis conduct. Both the trial and the supreme courts took a common sense view of the situation, and said that the matter was of little importance. It would seem, however, that on other than techni cal grounds, such as the character of the evidence) as hearsay, and the incompetency of a juror to impeach his own verdict, that a conclusion reached by a juror on evidence other than that arrived at in the court, is not in accordance with a strictly legal theory of evidence and conduct of trial.

61

PERSONAL INJURIES. (FELLOW SERVANT DOCTRINE —• DELEGATION OF DUTY.) ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT. In these days of the expansion of the fellow serv ant doctrine, the case of Rogers v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 71 Northeastern Reporter 850, is of interest. A fireman on a freight train was killed at a side track by being crushed between his engine and a car left on the side-track at a point where it ob structed the passing train. The railroad's train dispatcher had been notified of the existence of the obstruction and informed the conductor of the freight train upon which deceased was employed, but the conductor negligently failed to communi cate that information to the fireman. It was conceded that the different members of the train crew, including the conductor and fireman, were fellow servants within the "department rule" as it prevails in Illinois, where the accident occurred and where suit was brought. But the Supreme Court reversing the lower court said: "But we are here confronted with a rule of law, applicable to the facts of this case and binding upon the defend ant company, in no way affected or controlled by the fact that the conductor and the deceased were at the time fellow servants, and that the death of the latter was the result of the negligence of the former. When the defendant received informa tion of the obstruction, it became its duty to use reasonable diligence to warn the deceased of the danger; and that duty was one which it could not relieve itself of by directing his fellow servant to perform it. It being a duty owing by the master to the servant, it could not delegate that duty to another, even though a fellow servant of the de ceased, and absolve itself from liability for the injury resulting in consequence of the failure to communicate knowledge to the deceased of the increased hazard. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 242, 32 N. E. 285, 18 L. R. A. 215. Several other cases were cited in support of the decision: Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Avery. 109 Ill. 314; Chicago & Eastern Illi nois Railroad Co. v. Kneirim, 152 Ill. 458, 39 N. E. 324, 43 Am. St. Rep. 259; Mobile & Ohio Rail road Co. v. Godfrey, 155 Ill. 78, 39 N. E. 590; Hess v. Rosenthal, 160 HI. 621, 43 N. E. 743; Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Eaton, 194 Ill. 441, 62 N. E. 784, 88 Am. St. Rep. 161. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. (PHYSI CIAN AND PATIENT — TREATMENT OF PATIENT AGAINST His WILL.) NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS. The question whether that confidential relation ship which is presupposed to exist between physi-