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THE GREEN BAG

which Tipton had voluntarily left his native state and gone to the West India Islands in the em ployment of a phosphate company and resided there several years, and was held to have lost his domicile, is distinguished. The gist of the dis tinction drawn is the absence of volition in the first case, and its presence in the latter. FALSE REPRESENTATIONS. (BELIEF INCHRISTIAN SCIENCE — MATERIAL TREAT MENT FOR DISEASE.) MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT. The case of Meyer v. Knott, 100 Northwestern Reporter 907, in the words of the court, is "novel, not to say unique," and involves a rather attrac tive combination of psychological principles and pathological facts, and is expressly stated by the court to be considered upon the theory that Chris tian Science, as taught by Mrs. Eddy's book "Science and Health," is true. This work thus celebrates its initial appearance in the courts as an authority. The defendant was a teacher of Christian Science and "First Reader of the First Church of Christ, Scientist, of the City of Detroit," and the declaration alleged that she falsely and fraudulently represented to plaintiff that she was mentally and morally qualified and competent to give instruction in Christian Science mind healing, in reliance on which representations the plaintiff paid her a large sum of money for such instruction, but received no benefit therefrom. At the trial plaintiff produced evidence that two or three years prior to the contract defendant had had superfluous hair removed from her face by means of electrical treatment, and expert witnesses testi fied that superfluous hair is a "disease" known to pathology by the name of "hypertrichosis." The chief question in the case arises upon the compe tency of this evidence to show that defendant was not a true and conscientious believer in and fol lower of the principles of Christian Science, which is opposed to material treatment for disease. In considering the question the court says: "Apart from the consideration that this departure from the true faith, if it be such, occurred two years before the contract with plaintiff, thus leaving ample time for defendant to mature her belief, we deem it sufficient answer to the plaintiff's con tention that, if it be conceded that superfluous hair is a disease, it is also regarded by many as merely a facial blemish. Some conceal it as well as they may by the use of face powder, some have it re moved. The defendant, because her little son teased her about the appearance of this super fluous hair, caused hers to be removed. This was not done as a treatment for disease, but as a

means of making herself more presentable. We think this does not tend to show that defendant was guilty of fraud in holding herself out as a teacher of Christian Science."

LABOR CONTRACTS. (BREACH MADE A PENAL OFFENSE — CONSTITUTIONALITY.) ALABAMA SUPREME COURT. In the case of Toney v. State, 37 Southern Re porter 332, a recent act of the Alabama Legisla ture, providing that the breach of a labor contract should constitute a misdemeanor, was before the court upon the question of constitutionality. This remarkable statute was presumably passed to correct the great evils which result from the abandonment of farms by laborers and renters without justifiable excuse; perhaps after obtain ing advances and incurring indebtedness to the employer and often leaving the crops when it is almost impossible to secure other labor to work and harvest them. It provided, in brief, that any person who had contracted in writing to serve another for a given time, or any person who had by a written contract leased or rented land for a specified time, or any person who had contracted in writing to cultivate land or furnish teams or labor for this purpose, and who, before the expira tion of the contract, without the consent of the other party, and without sufficient excuse, (to be adjudged by the court,) should abandon said con tract and make a second contract of a similar na ture with other parties, without giving notice to the person with whom the first contract was made, should be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction should be subjected to fine or imprisonment, or both. It will be seen that the act in question prohibits the employé or renter from making subsequent contracts of the kind which he had seen fit to abandon, except under one of three conditions; the consent of the em ployer or renter, second the existence of an ex cuse for the abandonment, which could not be de termined except at the end of a criminal prosecu tion, and third, by the giving of notice of the exist ing contract to the future employer. The first condition could be made unavailable by the with holding of consent by the original employer, and the third would, of course, tend to prevent the making of a similar contract with a new employer for reasons which are obvious. The court un hesitatingly holds that such provisions are repug nant to the provisions of the United States Con stitution to the effect that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, in that it restricts the right of contract. It is