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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES general delegation of authority, and whether and to what extent such power may be delegated. E. F. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Due Process of Law — Administration of Estates of Absentees.) U. S. S. C. — In Cunnius v. Reading School Dis trict, 25 Supreme Court Reporter, 72i.it is held, abstractly, that the due process of law clause of the 1 4th Amendment does not wholly deprive the state of the power to confer jurisdiction on its courts to administer the estates of absentees, irre spective of the fact of death, by a special and appropriate proceeding, distinct from the general law for the settlement of estates of decedents, and specifically that Pennsylvania Laws, 1885, p. 155, providing a system of procedure for the administration of estates of absentees sufficiently complied with the requirements of due process of law. This last phase of the case requires the consid eration of three related propositions. It is first said that the provision authorizing the adminis tration of property of one who has been absent from the state for seven or more years is not, with respect to the period of absence, so unreasonable as to render it repugnant to the due process of law clause of the I4th Amendment. Closely con nected with this holding is the second proposition that, notice by publication of the special pro ceedings authorized by the statute satisfied the requirement of due process of law. Possibly the point of chief importance is the one last touched upon in the opinion, where it is determined that the provisions of the statute authorizing the rev ocation of the administration at any time on proof that the absentee is in fact alive, and in such event permitting him to recover the shares of his estate received by the distributees, and pro viding that until the latter shall give security for refunding their shares, with interest, in case the supposed decedent shall be alive, no distribution can be made and that in case of inability to give such security, the money shall be invested, under the control of the court, and only the interest paid to the distributees, furnishes sufficient safe guard for the protection of the property of the absentee to satisfy the requirement of due process of law. The decision will be welcomed as settling in the affirmative the question whether the states have power to provide for administering the estates of absentees. The case of Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 had created some doubts upon that point, and appears to have been understood by at least one court (Rhode Island, Carr v. Brown, 20 R. I. 217)

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as denying such power. The court now draws a clear distinction between administration of estates of absentees and of deceased persons. What is constitutionally sufficient for the latter, does not necessarily meet the requirements of due process as applied to the former. This is not merely a matter of jurisdiction of courts, which would not present a federal question. (In Scott v. McNeal the probate court had been organized under an act of Congress, but the decision did not go on that point.) It is a question of procedure and of methods of administration. The administration of an absentee's estate requires in addition to a reason able presumption of death, first, adequate notice according to the circumstances, not merely notice to the relatives who are interested adversely to the absentee; second, reasonable safeguards securing so far as possible the restoration of the property to the absentee, should he turn up alive. These requirements were met by the Pennsyl vania statute, while in Scott v. McNeal the absen tee was declared "dead to all legal intents and purposes," and the estate administered accordingly. E. F. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Eminent DomainPrivate Irrigating Ditch.) U. S. S. C. — Clark v. Nash, 25 Supreme Court Reporter. 6-6, is author ity for a proposition which while expressly limited to the particular facts involved in that case is, nevertheless, of such a nature that it may give rise to abundant litigation involving the applica bility of its principles to other, but similar states of fact. In the case referred to, it is held that the peculiar local conditions in Utah justify, as author izing condemnation for public use, a statute of that state under which an individual landowner may condemn a right of way across his neighbor's land for the enlargement of an irrigation ditch therein in order to enable him to obtain water from a stream in which he has an interest, to irrigate his land which otherwise would remain absolutely valueless. As throwing light upon the ground of the decision, it may not be amiss to call atten tion to the observation of the court that the valid ity of such statutes as the one under consideration may depend upon many different facts, the exis tence of which would make a public use, even by an individual, where in the absence of such facts the use would be clearly private. These facts, it is said, must be general, notorious, and acknowl edged in the state so that, though not the subject of legal investigation as to their existence, the local courts, nevertheless, know and appreciate them. In view of these considerations the court suggests that where the use is asserted to be pub lic and the right of the individual to condemn land

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