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THE GREEN BAG

and not nationality as the criterion in ques tions of personal law may not be without effect on the ultimate decision of this problem." "How, it may be asked, would the English courts regard jurisdiction raiionc origiiiis? On the cases, it would seem that, although not allowing allegiance as a ground of jurisdiction in their own practice, they will, nevertheless, recognize the decrees of foreign courts founded on it." CONFLICT OF LAWS (Jurisdiction). "Exit of the Doctrine of Situs," by John R. Rood, Central Law Journal (V. Ixi, p. 265). CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Citizens). An ex haustive review of our decisions relating to the Chinese Exclusion Act is contributed by B. Frank Dake to the September Albany Law Journal (V. Ixvii, p. 258), entitled "The China man before the Supreme Court." Of the re cent climax.in those decisions he says: "But a far more startling proposition is announced when the court, conceding for the puqooses of the argument that Ju Toy was an American citizen and entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, provid ing that- no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, states that he was not entitled to a judicial trial of the question of his citizenship, and that the power of determining that question may be entrusted to executive officers." If the rights flowing from American citizen ship, "when drawn in question, are not of sufficient importance to entitle the one who claims such rights to a judicial determination, it is difficult to imagine any right of sufficient magnitude to justify the exertion of judicial powers. The banishment of a citizen from the land of his birth is as much an act of punish ment as his incarceration in a penitentiary. If Congress can empower immigration officers to permanently banish American citizens, it is hard to see why it may not direct their summary execution. The difference would be in the degree of the punishment rather than in the power to inflict it. The Constitution draws no distinction between the power to banish and the power to hang." "In view of the nature of exclusion laws, the loose notions of Chinamen as to the sanctity of an oath, their similarity rendering identification difficult, the decision rendered

with reference to Ju Toy was probably neces sary if the exclusion laws are to be effective; but constitutional government is in danger when the judicial decision of constitutional questions is determined by considerations of political expediency or necessity; and in his person fundamental principles of American liberty have received a greater shock than the exclusive population of all of the Pacific states by subjects of the Celestial Kingdom would cause." CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Commerce). A very valuable monograph on "The Exclusiveness of the Power of Congress over Interstate and Foreign Commerce," by James S. Rogers, is published in the American Law Register for September and October (V. lui, pp. 529. 593). In opening he says: "Power over interstate commerce is granted by the same words as power over foreign com merce. No logical distinction can be made between them. Yet, although it is generally admitted that the power of Congress over foreign commerce is exclusive, three different theories have been advanced in the opinions of the court as to the power of Congress over interstate commerce. "First: That Congress has exclusive power over all interstate commerce. "Second: That Congress and the states have general concurrent power over all interstate commerce. "Third: That Congress has exclusive power over national, and Congress and the states concurrent power over local matters of inter state commerce." "This article is an endeavor to clarify the subject by a consideration of the three theo ries and the reasoning supporting them, and, as a result, to show that only the exclusive theory is sound. Then by tracing the theories chro nologically through the opinions of the court, by quotations therefrom, it is sought to let the reader judge for himself whether the court has not substantially acted upon that theory and is free to discard the other two, and that such action by the court would simplify the subject immensely . His argument is that, ' historically the pur pose of the commerce clause was to free com merce from control by the states; that the historic fact is that it was immediately so