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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES problem when the Ohio consignee is an inde pendent contractor who contemplates making sales in Kentucky. Further, as the Kentucky customer had been secured before the shipment to Ohio was made, and as the shipment to Ohio was restricted, apparently, to the very quantity thus ordered, the decision does not cover directly the problem when the shipment to Ohio precedes the receipt of the order from Kentucky, or even when the ship ment to Ohio exceeds the order. Eugene Wambaugh. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. (ISSUANCE OP VOID PROCESS — LIABILITY FOR FALSE IM PRISONMENT) N. Y. SUP. CT., APP. Div. 30 DEPT. In McCarg v. Burr, 94 New York Supplement, 675, a justice of the peace is held liable in dam ages for false imprisonment for trying, sentencing, and imprisoning a person vhcre he was without jurisdiction. Laws 1899, p. 520, c. 275, $ 35, gives justices of the peace in the city of Gloversville the same powers, duties, and jurisdiction, except in criminal cases, as justices of towns. Code Crim. Proc. $ 56, gives county courts of special sessions exclusive jurisdiction to deter mine charges of cruelty to animals. Code Crim. Proc. § 151, requires a warrant issued by a justice upon complaint to direct that defendant be brought before the magistrate issuing the same, or if the offense was committed in another town and is one which a court of special sessions has jurisdiction to try, it must direct that defendant be brought before a magistrate of the town in which the offense was committed. The holding under these statutes that a complaint charging cruelty to animals, committed in another town, did not authorize a justice in the city of Gloversville to make a warrant for the arrest of accused returnable to himself is fairly obvious. But it is also held, that since the warrant was in excess of the justice's jurisdiction to issue and was void, the act of the justice constituted false imprison ment. It is admitted, of course, that for an error of judgment in performing a judicial act a judicial officer is not responsible civilly. It is also pointed out that the cases are not entirely in accord in denning the border line beyond which an officer cannot go without subjecting himself to civil liability. Quoting from Blythe v. Tompkins, 2 Abb. Prac. 468, where it is held that a justice of the peace acts ministerially in issuing and de livering a criminal warrant, so that if a warrant is not valid on its face, the justice who issues and the officer who executes it are liable for false im prisonment, and citing Reynolds v. Orvis, 7 Cow.

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269, and Austin v. Vrooman, 128 N. Y. 233, 28N. E. 477, the court determines that the justice acted ministerially and not judicially, and was liable for issuing the void warrant. MANSLAUGHTER. (FAILURE TO FURNISH MEDICAL ATTENDANCE — RELIGIOUS BELIEF) INDIANA SUPREME COURT. Owing to a preliminary holding that where in a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter the court directed a verdict for defendant for the reason that the evidence was insufficient to sus tain a conviction, the sufficiency of the indict ment cannot be reviewed on appeal, although the court intimated that it did not charge a defense the case of State v. Chenowcth, 71 Northeastern Reporter, 197, contains no direct decision upon the merits. It is, however, strongly intimated that where it is the duty of a person in charge of an infant child to furnish it with medical atten dance in order to relieve or cure it of disease, it is no defense to a prosecution for manslaughter in case the child dies from want of such attendance that defendant conscientiously believed that the teachings of the Bible forbade recourse to medi cal attendance for that purpose and taught that prayer was a cure for all disease. In the course of the dictum it is stated that the religious doctrine or belief of a person cannot be recognized as a justification or excuse for his committing an act which is a criminal offense under the law of the land. In support of this doctrine a number of cases are cited including Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244; Miles v. United States, 103 U. S. 304, 26 L. Ed. 481; Specht v. Commonwealth, 49 Am. Dec. 518; Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N. E. 224, 2 L. R. A. 142, 12 Am. St. Rep. 566; Regina v. Downes, 13 Cox, C. C. in; Rcgina v. Senior. 1899, i Q. B. 283; i Bishop, New Cr. Law, 344, 345; People v. Pierson, N. Y., 68 N. E. 243. MARRIAGE. (IMPEDIMENT — EFFECT AS TO INNOCENT PARTY) TEXAS SUPREME COURT. A peculiar holding, the explanation of which is to be found in geographical and historical facts, and in a somewhat self-contradictory statute to which those facts gave rise, is contained in Barkley v. Dumke, 87 Southwestern Reporter, 1147. Therein it is decided that under the Texas Act of January 20, 1840, entitled "An act to adopt the common law of England, to repeal certain Mexi can laws and to regulate the marital rights of parties," (the body of which is, however, with