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a quantity of land in the state of Arkansas, upon which land he hunted. As a conclusion from a number of cases cited and considered, it is held that the state's ownership of fish and game, is not such a proprietary interest as will authorize the granting of a special interest therein, but is solely for regulation and preservation for common use and is not inconsistent with a claim of indi vidual or special ownership by the owner of the soil. In support of this conclusion the court cites the following cases: Sanboni v. Ice Com pany, 82 Minn. 43, 84 N. W. 641, 51 L. R. A. 829, 83 Am. St. Rep. 401; Ice Co. v. Davenport, 149 Mass. 322, 21 N. E. 385, 14 Am. St. Rep. 425; Rowell v. Doyle, 131 Mass. 474; Brown v. Cun ningham, 82 Iowa. 512, 48 N. W. 1042, L. R. A. 583; Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441; Wood man v. Pittman, 79 Me. 456, 10 Atl. 321, i Am. St. Rep. 342; Priewe v. Improvement Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N. W. 918, 33 L. R. A. 645; McLen nan v. Prentice, 85 Wis. 427. 55 N. W. 764; Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 13 Sup. Ct. no, 36 L. Ed. 1018. As a more or less necessary corollary of this holding it is decided that a landowner's right to take fish and game on his own land which inheres in him by reason of his ownership of the soil, is a property right subject only to the state's owner ship and title held to regulate and preserve the public use, and hence that a law prohibiting a non-resident landowner from enjoying this prop erty right to the same extent that it is enjoyed by a resident land owner denies the equal protec tion of the law, and that the taking of such right, merely because of non-residence, is without due process of law.

parties that the articles agreed to be sold and de livered shall be actually delivered, is held in State v. McGinnis, 51 Southeastern Reporter, 50, not to be violative of the constitutional provision guar antying equal protection of the laws, merely be cause section 7 of the act provides that it shll not apply to any business corporation, etc., en gaged in the purchase or sale of the necessary commodities required in the ordinary course of business. This provision is held not to constitute a discrimination, because not only the person mentioned in the exception, but all other persons have a right under the law to make bona fide dealings in futures, so that the exception in the statute was merely the product of an excessive caution. The statute further provides that proof that nothing was actually delivered at the date of the contract and that a margin was put up shall be prima facie evidence that the contract was a wagering one. Section 7 above quoted, limits the application of this provision to such an extent that it does not apply to purchases or sales by manufacturers or wholesale merchants of necessary commodities required in the ordinarycourse of their business, and this exception is contended to be a discrimination forbidden by amendment 14 of the Federal Constitution. It is. however, held that as the provision is a mere rule of evidence, it does not render the act invalid, inasmuch as the power to prescribe when, and under what circumstances, and as to what events a certain act chall be prima facie evidence is within the legislative discretion in the exercise of the police power. HIGHWAYS.

A distinction is to be taken between such game or fish as may be found within the boundaries of private property and such game or fish as may be found elsewhere. The taking of game or fish of the latter sort may be restricted to citizens of the state. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 (1823); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1877). In holding that the rule is otherwise as to game and fish found within the boundaries of private property, the principal case indicates the inac curacy of the rather common allegation that the ownership of wild animals not yet reduced to possession is in the state. See Geer v. Connecti cut, 161 U. S. 519 (1896). Eugene Wambaugh.

(AUTOMOBILES — LICENSE) ST. Louis COURT OP APPEALS. Mo. Laws, 1903, p. 163, section 4, declares that any person desiring to operate an automobile in a city must procure a license from the license com missioner thereof, and if he desires to operate it in the county outside the city limits, he shall procure a license from the county clerk of such county. In construing this statute in case of State v. Cobb, 87 Southwestern Reporter. 551, the St. Louis Court of Appeals rules that a license has only a local application, affords no protection be yond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the officer who issues it, and. consequently, that an automobile owner is required to take out a license in each and every county over the roads of which he desires to run his machine.

GAMING. (DEALING IN FUTURES — CONSTITU TIONAL LAW) NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT. North Carolina Laws, 1905, c. 538, prohibiting dealing in futures, where it is not intended by the

HUSBAND AND WIFE. (COMMUNITY PROP ERTY — RIGHT OF ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES) TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS. Without argument or citation of authority, it