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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES CARRIERS (VIOLENCE OF STRIKE SYMPA THIZERS — INJURY то PASSENGER — LIABIL ITY OF CARRIER) RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT. Bosworth v. Union Railroad Company. 58 At lantic Reporter, 982, holds that under the evi dence in that case, a railroad company is not liable to a passenger injured by the unlawful acts of strikers and their sympathizers. Plaintiff was a passenger on a street car running between two towns, and was injured by a stone thrown by one of a mob of strike sympathizers. A strike had been on for several days accompanied by violence, but the mob had been suppressed in one of the towns, and cars were running regularly at the time. There was no indication of danger to plaintiff or the motorman as the car passed, until stones were thrown, except the presence of a large crowd of people on the street which might be regarded as indicating danger. Policemen were present, and though the preceding car had been stoned, such car was not in sight of the motorman of the car on which plaintiff was riding at the time, and the stoning thereof was unknown to him. This evidence was held insufficient to •show notice to the carrier that it was dangerous to run cars there. Two other questions of inter est are decided in this case, to wit, that the court will take judicial notice of the historical fact that on the day of the injury, the Governor had ordered a military force to the town in question to preserve order and to restrain violence towards the property and employees of the railroad com pany, and had issued a proclamation calling upon all persons riotously assembled to disperse, and also that these facts did not constitute notice to the company that it was dangerous to run its cars, but were rather an invitation to operate its road under the protection of the militia. CHECKS (Loss — EXECUTION OF DUPLICATE — LIABILITY OF INDORSER OF ORIGINAL CHECK) TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS. The nature of a duplicate copy of a negotiable instrument executed in lieu of an original which has been lost, is very well illustrated in Lewis v. Commercial National Bank, 83 Southwestern Reporter, 423. A check was indorsed by the payee and by the indorsee again indorsed to a bank for collection. The bank lost it. After ward the bank obtained a duplicate check which was indorsed by the payee of the original check. When the duplicate was presented for payment, the maker had no funds and the bank sued the payee. Under these circumstances, it is held that the payee's indorsement of the duplicate

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check did not change his relation to the original, or create any liability on the duplicate other or different from the liability he assumed by indorse ment of the original, and as the laches of the bank in failing to present the original within a reason able time prevented it from enforcing the payee's liability on that check, he was not liable on the duplicate. CONTEMPT. (LIBEL OP COURT — PUBLICATION AFTER TERMINATION OF CAUSE) VIRGINIA COURT OF APPEALS. In Burdett v. Commonwealth, 48 Southeastern Reporter, 878, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia holds that where one convicted on a criminal prosecution publishes a libelous article concerning the conduct of the judge in the case, the court has power to punish him for contempt, though the cause has ended by entry of judgment and satisfaction thereof. It is conceded that there are a large number of cases outside of Vir ginia which hold that courts are without authority to punish as a contempt a publication with re spect to an ended cause. Blackstone's definition of contempt, as speaking or writing contemptu ously of the court or judge's act in their judicial capacity, and the definition contained in Cyc. vol. 9, p. 6 of a constructive contempt, are quoted to show that publications, concerning the court with respect to a cause, may constitute contempt and be punished as such after the termination of the cause. A number of other cases including the recent Missouri case of State v. Shepherd. 76 S. W. 79; Dandridge's case, 2 Va. Cases 417; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384; Pryor's case, 18 Kan. 72, Wooley's case, n Bush. 95; Chadwick's case, 67 N. W. 1072, are cited as holding in a general way the doctrine, that by the common law courts possess the power to punish for contempt, for libelous articles upon their proceedings, pending or past. Incidentally, it is also held that a sum mary punishment as for contempt for the publi cation of a newspaper article is not an invasion of the liberty of the press. DEEDS. (CONSIDERATION — DELIVERY IN ES CROW) NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, TRIAL TERM. A husband executed a deed conveying property to his wife, and placed it in escrow to be de livered to the grantee, if the grantor got drunk again. The grantor did get drunk again, but at the time of his death, the deed had not been delivered. This, it is held, was not a delivery in escrow, because not made pursuant to any valid contract, and not depending upon any condition