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THE GREEN BAG

tors. Hyde v. Woods, 94 U.S. 523; People ex rel. Lemon v. Feitner, 167 N.Y. i, 60 N.E. 265, and Matter of Hellman, 174 .Y. 254. 66 N.E. 809, are cited in support of the holding that the seat was property of such a nature that it could be transferred to the trustee. BILLS AND NOTES. (DRAFTS — BONA FIDE HOLDERS) N.Y. SUP. CT., APP. Div., 30 DEPT. In Hathaway v. Delaware County, 93 New York Supplement, 436, it appeared that an ex-county treasurer, fraudulently pretending to act as a representative of the county treasurer, repre sented that the county wished to borrow money from a certain bank and procured a draft payable to the county treasurer, which the latter in good faith, supposing that the ex-treasurer was the owner of the draft, received and accepted in dis charge of the shortage in the ex-treasurer's ac counts. After the draft had been collected and its proceeds passed to the credit of the county, the bankers who drew it sought to recover from the county, on the ground that the fact that the draft was made payable directly to the county treasurer was notice of the irregularity in the procurement of the draft. In passing upon this claim, the court suggests that it seems to have a good deal of force, and says that if the question were a new one, they would be inclined to hold that upon its face such a draft discredits the claim that the alleged purchaser has any owner ship in it, but that they consider themselves bound by the case of Goshen National Bank v. State, 141 N.Y. 379, 36 N.E. 316, where on a state of facts very much similar, it was held that the form of such a draft was not notice to the person to whom it was made payable, of any irregularity in the means by which the person having possession of the draft obtained it. BRIBERY. (CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE — TENDER OF CHECK) U. S. D. C., NORTHERN DISTRICT NEW YORK. In United States v. Green, 136 Federal Reporter, 618 (one of the cases growing out of the alleged bribery of George W. Beavers of the Postal De partment), the Federal District Court for the Northern District of New York decides that the tendering by a person of his personal check, drawn on a bank and payable to an officer of the United States, to such officer with intent to thereby affect his official action, does not consti tute the crime of bribery under Rev. St. § 5451 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3680). since such a check made and delivered for such an illegal purpose is

void, and is not within any of the classes of instru ments enumerated in the statute. The statute provides that every person who promises, offers, or gives, or causes or procures to be promised, offered or given, any money or other thing of value, or makes or tenders any contract under taking obligation, gratuity, or security for the payment of money to any officer of the United States with intent to influence his decision or action, shall be punished, etc. After the citation of an almost infinite number of authorities, both text writers and cases, as to the meaning of the various terms used in the statute, it is decided, as above stated, that a check given under the circumstances mentioned does not fall within the description of any of the instruments mentioned in the statute, is not a thing of value, and hence the tendering of it not an infraction of the statute. CARRIERS.

(BAGGAGE — PAPERS) MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT. A recent contribution to the list of cases by which the term "baggage" is being defined by a process of exclusion, is that of Yazoo & Missis sippi Valley Railroad Company r. Georgia Home Insurance Company, 37 Southern Reporter. 500, in which the Supreme Court of Mississippi holds that memoranda and papers in the possession of an agent, but relating exclusively to the business of his principal, and carried by the agent solely for business purposes, are not baggage when put by the agent in his trunk, and that in the absence of consent or custom of the railroad to accept such papers as baggage, no damage can be re covered either for the loss of the papers or for delay in their shipment and delivery. The defi nition of baggage given by Chief Justice Cockburn in Macrow v. Great Western Railway Company, L. R. 6 Q. B. 622, wherein it is said, that whatever the passenger takes with him for his personal use or convenience, according to the habits or wants of the particular class to which he belongs, either with reference to the immediate necessities or to the ultimate purpose of the journey, must be considered as personal baggage, is referred to as being as accurate a definition as can be found; and it is said that to hold that the papers under consideration constitute baggage would expand the definition of that word beyond anything warranted by any well-considered case. The cases of Staub v. Kendrick, 23 N. E. 79, and Gleason v. Goodrich Transportation Company, 14 Am. Rep., 716, are referred to and distinguished from the case at Bar, in that in both of those cases the property destroyed was the property of the agent personally.