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mere words of wish or recommendation do not create a trust. . . . The conclusion of the whole matter seems to be that, as stated by Lord St. Leonards in 1849, where testators mean to make their own will, and to leave no discretion, they should be encouraged to say so by the use of imperative and mandatory words, and that it is inexpedient, and likely to mislead and defeat the real testamentary intention, if imperative words and words of recommendation are permitted to be used in the same will with the same legal effect, al though their popular meaning is different." TRUSTS (Right of Trustee to Purchase) IN the July Law Quarterly Review (Vol. xxi, p. 258), Walter G. Hart discusses "The De velopment of the Rule in Keech v. Sandford." "In this case Lord Chancellor King de cided that a trustee of a lease who had re newed the lease in his own name and for his own benefit, was a constructive trustee for his cestui que trust of the renewed lease, al though there was no proof of fraud and the lessor had declined to renew for the benefit of the cestui que trust. The Chancellor said that the trustee should rather have let it run out than have had the lease to himself. The ground on which the rule is based is in fact that of public policy. "Two questions with reference to the ex

tent of the rule applied in these cases have lately been the subject of decision. The first is — what constitutes a fiduciary relation within the rule? From the judgment of Lord Justice Collins it would seem that in the case of trustees, executors, administrators, and agents, and also tenants for life there is a con clusive presumption of personal incapacity to retain the benefit in such cases. But that in the case of mortgagees (and mortgagors?) and partners there is only a rebuttable presump tion of fact. "The second and more recently discussed of the two questions is — when does the pur chase by a trustee of a lease of the reversion in fee simple fall within the rule? The learned judge held that it only applied where the lease is renewable by contract or by custom. "It is submitted that the introduction of the distinction as regards the purchase of the reversion, between leases renewable by con tract or custom and those to which no such 'tenant right' is attached, while no such dis tinction is drawn as regards the actual re newal of the lease, imports into this branch of the law an ' inelegantia ' which destroys the symmetry of the rule and makes it more difficult of application, which is inconsistent with several of the decisions and which ought not to be admitted without more careful con sideration of the principles on which the rule is based than has yet been given to it."