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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES holds that no cause of action is stated against defendant. Smith v. L. & N. R. Co., 95 Ky. n, 23 S. W. 652; Lexington Ry. Co. v. Cozine, 64 S. W. 848, and William's Adm'r v. Southern Ry. Co. in Kentucky, 73 S. W. 779, are cited as illustra tions of malicious actions of a servant for which the master is liable, and are distinguished from the case at Bar in the fact that in each of the cases cited, the servant was engaged in some manner in performing his regular duties or further ing the interests of the master. NEGLIGENCE.

(ATTEMPT TO SAVE LIFE) TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT. A reaffirmation of the doctrine that the law will not impute negligence to one who imperils his safety in an attempt to rescue another from a position of danger, is contained in the case of Ridley v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 86 Southwestern Reporter, 606. A railroad employee saw a boy, unconscious of his danger, standing on defendant's track in front of a rapidly approaching train, and in an attempt to rescue him, was killed. Under these circumstances, it is held that deceased was not guilty of contributory negligence, and the principle is laid down in general terms that one is justified in attempting to save human life, when it is imperiled by great danger, and in a sudden emergency, and in such cases the rescuer need not stop and hesitate and weigh probabil ities until it is too late to make the rescue, but that it is sufficient if he acts with such care as a reasonably prudent person would use in such an emergency and under similar circumstances. In support of the proposition, the following cases are cited: Pennsylvania v. Roney, 8g Ind. 433; Linehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506; Eckert v. R. Co., 43 N. Y. 503; Gibney v. State, 137 N. Y. 6, 33 N. E. 142, and Spooner v. R. R., 115 N. Y. 34, 21 N. E. 696. PATENTS. (LICENSE RESTRICTING USE — CON TRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT) U. S. CIR. CT., E. D. WISCONSIN. The principle originally laid down in Victor Talking Machine Company v. The Fair, 123 Fed eral Reporter, 424, is reasserted in Brodrick Copygraph Company of New Jersey v. Mayhew, 131 Federal Reporter, 92, in which it is held that it is within the right of the owner of a patent for a machine to sell the machines under a license, containing a condition that they shall be used only in connection with patented materials, also made by such owner, and that one who makes and sells to users other materials specially designed and intended to be used in such machines, and

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which are so used, is liable as a contributory infringer. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS. (CHRISTIAN SCIENCE HEALER — LIABILITY FOR NEGLI GENCE — STANDARD OP CARE) NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT. An interesting discussion of the legal obligations of one professing to cure disease by means of Christian Science, and of the standard by which his treatment is to be judged, is contained in Spead v. Tomlinson, 59 Atlantic Reporter, 376. A number of interesting questions are raised by assignments of error, only a brief summary of the decision being possible here. It is held in effect that the standard of care by which a Chris tian Science healer is to be judged, is the care, skill, and knowledge of the ordinary Christian Scientist, who undertakes to treat diseases ac cording to the method practiced by such healers, and that he is not to be judged by the standards applicable to the ordinary physicians. The facts showed that the plaintiff, who was afflicted with appendicitis, applied to defendant, a Christian Science healer, for treatment, and was told to keep about the room, to eat anything she wanted, and not to lie down. The directions are held not to be proof of any negligence on the part of the healer, in the absence of any showing that the principles of Christian Scie"nce practice require any other course of treatment. Plaintiff is also denied a recovery on the ground of deceit and misrepresentation. The defendant declared him self able to effect a cure by the use of his methods, and it is held as the statement was made with respect to a matter as to which the defendant could have no personal knowledge, it could not be made the foundation of an action for deceit, unless it was made with knowledge of its falsity, of which there was no evidence. The contention that defendant was liable because his course of conduct was unlawful is met by the statement that if it was unlawful for defendant to administer such treatment, it was equally unlawful for plain tiff to knowingly employ him to give such treat ment or consent to be so treated, and that conse quently her own illegal act contributed to whatever injury she received. POLICE OFFICERS. (DISORDERLY HOUSB — UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS) N. Y. SUP. CT., SPECIAL TERM. In Delaney v. Flood, 91 N. Y. Supp. 672, the plaintiff is denied an injunction to restrain a police captain from posting officers in front of a hotel where liquors were sold, and which the