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THE GREEN BAG

as required by the Interstate Commerce Act, it was the only lawful rate it could have demanded, and hence that a shipper could not recover because it was excessive. The Court of Civil Appeals, how ever, holds, basing its opinion to some extent on the case of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub lishing Co., 181 U. S. 92, 21 Supreme Court Re porter, 561, that the shipper might in the state court, under the common law, be afforded relief from the unreasonable rates, notwithstanding the fact that they had been filed and promulgated by the carrier.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. (CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION — REMONSTRANCES TO LIQUOR WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT.

The act of a landlord in joining with other property owners in a protest against the issuance of a liquor license to the tenant is held by the Supreme Court of Washington not to constitute a constructive eviction. An ordinance of the city where the property was situated, provided that no license should issue if the owners of certain ad jacent lots should protest against its issuance, and after the execution of the lease the landlord as owner of lots other than that on which the saloon was located, joined with other lot owners in a re monstrance, which remonstrance would not have been sufficient to defeat the license without the cooperation of the landlord. The decision that this was not a constructive eviction is based upon the ground that the tenant acquired no interest in lots other than that in cluded in the lease. This is made clear by the fact that if the landlord had sold the other lots, the buyer would have been under no obligation to refrain from joining in a protest. The cases of Brown v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 152 Mass. 463, 25 N. E. 966, and Grabenhorst v. Nicodemus, 42 Md. 236, which were relied on by the tenant, are distinguished. In the first of these cases the landlord leased a building including certain ma chinery and also agreed to provide power for the running of the machinery, and his subsequent re fusal to supply the power was held an eviction. In the other case the property was leased for use as a distillery, and the tenant could not legally make use of the business until he had filed with the United States collector the written consent of the lessor, permitting the building to be used for a distillery, so that the refusal of the landlord to give such consent was very properly held an eviction. Kellogg v. Lowe, 80 Pacific Reporter, 458. LICENSES (DISCRIMINATION — TRADING STAMPS) ALABAMA SUPREME COURT. The value of some of the somewhat general

provisions of the ordinary Bill of Rights is illus trated by the case of City Council of Montgomery v. Kelly, 38 Southern Reporter 67, in which it is held that a city ordinance requiring merchants giving trading stamps to pay a license fee of $100, in addition to that required of merchants en gaged in the same business but not giving trading stamps, is in contravention of the constitutional provision of Alabama that among the inalienable rights of citizens are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that the sole object of govern ment is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. The court argues that if it were permissible to place an additional burden upon a merchant who chooses to advertise his business by offering a small gratuity to cus tomers in the shape of trading stamps, it would be equally lawful to place an extra burden on one who advertised in the papers or one who offered out of his own stock a certain gratuity to every one purchasing goods to a certain amount or one erecting a handsome sign in front of his store. The following list of cases is cited in sup port of the holdings: Young v. Commonwealth (Va.) 45 S. E. 327; State v. Dalton, 22 R. I. 77, 46 Atl. 234, 48 L. R. A. 775, 84 Am. St. Rep. 818; People ex rel. Madden v. Dycker, 72 App. Div. 308, 76 N. Y. Supp. in; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465; Long v. State, 74 Md. 565, 22 Atl. 4, 12 L. R. A. 425, 28 Am. St. Rep. 268; Ex parte McKenna, 126 Cal. 429, 58 Pac. 916. LIFE INSURANCE (PREMIUM NOTES — OBLI GATION OF INSURED) INDIANA APPELLATE COURT. In Union Mutual Life Insurance Company of Portland, Me. v. Adler, 73 Northeastern Reporter 835, the right of an insurance company to collect a note given for unearned premiums on a life insurance policy is denied. The holding proceeds upon the theory that a provision in the policy requiring insured to pay subsequent premiums is a mere option, the exercise of which is necessary to keep the insurance in effect, but does not con stitute a debt. The result would naturally follow that since the insurer could not compel the con tinuance of the insurance, nor the payment of subsequent premiums, it could not collect a note given therefor. It is, however, important to observe that in this case the note was not a simple promissory note but that it provided that on failure to pay it when due, the policy should become void. Indeed, the court intimates that it is possible that had the note been an ordinary promissory note, the insurance company would have had an option either to surrender the note