Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 17.pdf/471

 THE GREEN BAG rectness of the doctrine for us, however, he contends that our decision is no precedent for their case,' especially as the language of the two provisions is not the same. CONTRACTS (Conditions)

A DISCUSSION of the law relating to the "Conditions in Contract," by Clarence D. Ashley, appears in the June Yale Law Journal, (V. xiv, p. 424). The author contends that the common classification of such conditions is erroneous, and that in reality there is no such thing as a condition subsequent in contracts; that conditions usually so-called are either in truth conditions precedent or in certain special cases "limitations attached to the procedure." In answer to the contention that by drawing their conditions in the form called subsequent, parties "indicate their intention that the burden of establishing, in reference to such condition precedent, shall be shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant," he answers that "it is not at all probable that the parties had such intention and it does not appear that the courts have decided on that ground." "Where they have held that the burden was upon the defendant, it seerns to have been solely upon the ground that they supposed they were dealing with a true condition sub sequent and that, therefore, the burden was naturally upon the defendant. The fault was with their analysis." COPYRIGHT (Duration of) To the June Yale Law Journal (V. xiv, p. 417) Samuel J. Elder contributes an article on "Duration of Copyright." After showing some uncertainties and inequalities in the operation of the present law, he contends for more extended period of copyright than that now accorded in this country. "There is," he says, "no abstract reason why men should not have the right to leave to their offspring the work of their brain. Everything that can be said in favor of abso lute ownership of the work of a man's hands can be said of the product of his mind, and more. But society steps in at this point and says that the right of all is greater than the right of any one, and that it is necessary at some time that contributions to knowledge

and literature should become public property. So that the question to be decided is, at what time does the public need require that private copyright shall cease? No help is to be had from the term of patents. The industrial world needs the right to use inventions speedily. Progress in mechanical and electrical arts is constantly stayed by prior patents, to which tribute must be paid. The daily life and work of the people is affected. And, besides, there is no such thing as "fair use" of a patent. An author's work may be quoted, criticised, made the basis of discussion up to the point of reducing its salability. No other writer is hampered by it. So that he does original work, he may reach, write, and publish the same result as the original author and ma}' use the latter's work to help him do so. Not so the patent. It is an absolute barrier and its exis tence should be short." HISTORY (Code of Hammurabi) IN the American Law Review (V. xxxix, p. 330) Owen B. Jenkins describes "The Code of Hammurabi, Compared with American Law." From an examination of the recent translation of this ancient tablet, he finds that civil and criminal laws were not scientifically divided but interlaced each other, the punishment for a crime being mentioned when the crime was suggested, by the definition of a civil right which it would violate. Although in this sense rambling, the code develops certain principles of jurisprudence, foremost among which is that of restitution. The lex taliottis is also given full sway. The doctrine of local responsibility resembles the early Anglo-Saxon responsibility of the "hundreds." There is also an apparent effort "to make the punish ment fit the crime." There is very little superstition in the code, and many of its pro visions agree with our law, and some of them anticipate its development, for example, in Babylonia, the husband was not liable for the wife's debts contracted before marriage. "All obligations of this kind ended in Pennsylvania in 1848 and in New York in 1853, which states are now on the footing of Hammurabi's code in this matter. After the young household was started all property jointly or severally held by it, was liable for debts contracted in its behalf, a more equitable arrangement than