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 EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT CONFLICT OF LAWS (Foreign Judgments)

JURISDICTION Over Non-Residents in Per sonal Actions is discussed by Edward Q. Keasbey, in the June Columbia Law Re view (V. v, p. 436). Referring to the article by Sir William Kennedy on this same subject, in the Journal of the Society of Compara tive Legislation, reviewed in our February number, he calls attention to the fact that in defining the "irreducible minimum of the requirements of a foreign judgment which the Courts of any country should give effect to " he purposely omitted the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, viz: that to give jurisdiction in personam there must be service of the writ within the jurisdiction. The author then ex plains the distinction between the English and American law in that the former by statute in some cases permits service of the writ beyond the jurisdiction in actions in personam, which the author regards as of im portance to xis in view of "the tendency of our courts to apply the doctrine of Pennoyer and Neff to cases in which they are not bound under the Constitution to accept it as law, and in view of the great practical necessity there is for giving some effect to service of notice beyond the limits of several states within one country." "The English courts recognize that they cannot pronounce a valid jttdgment when they have no jurisdiction, but under the orders of court permitting service to be made on a foreigner abroad in cases relating to contracts made in England or to be performed in Eng land, they do not admit that the service of process within their own territory is essential to jurisdiction, nor that the service of a for eigner abroad in a suit on an English con tract is not due process of law." The courts of the state of the former, therefore, will recognize the judgment. This the author thinks we should adopt as law. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Federal Corporation Law)

To the June Columbia Law Review (V. v, p. 415) H. W. Chaplin contributes an illuminat ing discussion of the problem of " National In corporation. " He criticises at the start the habit that has been assumed of considering the question solely with reference to the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign

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commerce, and in his discussion he treats of a number of provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which bear upon this question. First. The power of Congress as a local sovereign to authorize incorporation in the District of Columbia, or the territories, which corporations have power to compete with those of the states. Second. Congress, in the enforcement of a national police power in the interest of public order, so far as its power of legislation extends, may establish a code of morality or propriety and may enforce it throughout the entire field of national activity. "From the very infancy of formulated law among the English-speaking peoples, an as sumption by any individual, without special dispensation, of more than what was con sidered, at a given time or place, his reasonable share of business or of work — an assumption, that is to say, of a share so great as to inter fere with the free and natural flow of trade, or with the necessary or natural and proper oppor tunities of others — has, with or without legis lation, been deemed dishonest, or immoral, as inconsistent with wholesome conditions in the community. 'Forestalling,' 're-grating,' 'en grossing, ' general or local ' monopoly, ' con tracts ' in restraint ' of ' trade ' or of ' labor, ' have, at various times and in different forms and in different degrees, been in conflict with the sense of fitness and propriety of the Eng lish-speaking peoples. For centuries, the record has been unbroken; differences and dis tinctions have been only in applications of the general rule. Congress, in the Sherman Act, has adopted the general principle into the body of Federal public policy; and, having adopted it, has — under the interpretation given to the Sherman Act by the Supreme Court — carried the principle, to a degree of strictness and rigidity never before known, and has introduced it, as a compulsory stand ard, into the whole field of interstate and internation commerce. As with monopoly, so with combination. From time immemorial, the common law has drawn a distinction, not merely of degree, but of kind, between action of a single individual, and combined action, or even joint planning, of two or more persons." In fine — harsh and unfamiliar as the pro position is, when put nakedly — the mere fact