Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 17.pdf/416

 NOTES OF RECENT CASES liberty. The right to withdraw from the public gaze at such times as a person may see fit, when his presence in public is not demanded by any rule of law, is also embraced within the right of personal liberty. Publicity in one instance, and privacy in the other, are each guaranteed. If personal liberty embraces the right of publicity, it no less embraces the correlative right of pri vacy." The contention that the right of privacy cannot exist because it is in irreconcilable conflict with the liberty of speech and of the press guaran teed by the Constitution, is disposed of by the statement that liberty of speech and of the press, when exercised within the bounds of the constitu tional guarantees, are limitations upon the exer cise of the right of privacy, so that the law will not permit the right of privacy to be asserted in such a way as to curtail or restrain such liberties. The one may be used to keep the other within lawful bounds, but neither can be lawfully used to destroy the other. The cases of Chapman v. Telegraph Company, 88 Ga. 763, 15 S. E. 901; Mackenzie v. Mineral Springs Company, 18 N. Y. Supp. 240; Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N. Y. Supp. 787 19 N. Y. Supp. 264, 24 N. Y. Supp. 509; Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N. Y. Supp. 908; Corliss v. Walker, 57 Fed. 434, 64 Fed. 280; Murray v. Lithographic Company, 28 N. Y. Supp. 271; Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285; Jacobus v. Children of Israel, 107 Ga. 518, 33 S. E. 853, are referred to and analyzed. These cases involve facts which might have given rise to a recognition of the right of privacy, but those of them in which a recovery is allowed were expressly based upon principles derived from the law of property, trust, and contract, any recognition of the exis tence of arightof privacy being studiously avoided. This fact is of course admitted, but is satisfac torily accounted for by the statement that the true lawyer, when called to the discharge of judicial functions, displays remarkable conserva tism, and wherever it is legally possible to base a judgment upon principles which have been recog nized by a long course of judicial decision, does so in preference to applying a principle which might be considered novel. Referring to the decision in the Roberson case, the court says that with all due respect to Chief Judge Parker and his concurring associates, they think the conclusion reached was the result of an unconscious yielding to the feeling of conserva tism naturally arising in the mind of a judge who faces a novel proposition. That the Georgia court is most thoroughly persuaded that the right exists is evidenced by the concluding para graph of that portion of the opinion which deals with his question. "So thoroughly satis fied are we that the law recognizes, within

395

proper limits, as a legal right, the right of privacy, and that the publication of one's picture without his consent by another as an adver tisement, for the mere purpose of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser, is an inva sion of this right, fchat we venture to predict that the day will come that the American Bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability, just as in the present day we stand amazed that Lord Coke should have combated with all the force of his vigorous nature the proposition that the Court of Chancery had jurisdiction to entertain an appli cation for injunction to restrain the enforcement of a common law judgment which had been ob tained by fraud, and that Lord Hale, with perfect composure, imposed the death penalty forwitchcraft upon ignorant and harmless women." STRIKES. (UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS — LIABILITY OF LABOR UNIONS) SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT. Although it contains no direct decision upon any substantive point, the case of F. R. Patch Mfg. Co. v. Protection Lodge No. 215, Interna tional Association of Machinists, 60 Atlantic Re porter, 74, is not without some interest, arising from the apparently conceded liability of an unin corporated labor union for a conspiracy to injure the business of the employer. The declaration alleged that defendant conspired with its mem bers and other labor organizations to force the plaintiff to adopt a schedule of hours of labor and a rate of wages which would make it impossible for plaintiff to operate its business except at a loss; that its employes, by the direction of de fendant, quit their work and conspired and con federated together to force plaintiff to accede to their illegal demands by threats, intimidations, and bribery, and sought by violence to intimidate and drive away the other workmen of the plaintiff, and detailed pickets, spies, and watchmen to stand guard about and near the plaintiff's works and pre vent other workmen taking employment therein; that they intercepted and prevented other men whom plaintiff had employed from engaging in the plaintiff's service and by threats and intimida tions caused a large number of workmen whom plaintiff had employed, to quit its service. Plain tiff had judgment in the trial court, and on appeal the only questions raised related to evidence and practice points, it being apparently conceded that the declaration stated a cause of action. The fact that but few other cases are reported where a recovery was obtained upon the same ground, makes the implied recognition of the existence of the cause of action in this case of importance, although it is not directly passed upon.