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THE GREEN BAG

v. Thomas in 1904, go very far toward accom plishing without statute a large part, if not all, of what was actually effected by the Contin gent Remainders Act of 1877." In those of the United States where statutes similar to the English Contingent Remainders Act have not been adopted, these cases are important au thority "as furnishing a possible basis for the contention that the rule, which made certain contingent future interests destructible and thereby defeated the expressed intent of the testator or settlor.no longer exists." In expla nation of his theory he gives a careful analysis of the different forms of contingent future in terests and the history of the present technical rules as to their validity. He shows how the feudal rules regarding contingent remainders, as finally formulated by Lord Northington, defeated the intention of the testator, and how Jessel, M.R., finally overruled his doctrine. He regards the case of Letchmere v. Lloyd as, as notable an example "of law reform as was Lord Mansfield's in Perrin v. Blake. The two instances are not dissimilar. In each the re former laid hold of a more than usually em phatic expression of intent to declare that a rule of law which defeated a settlor's or testa tor's intention should not prevail. Lord Mans field's effort never became law and has been long since condemned. Jessel's has prevailed. The reason is twofold. Both Jessel's and Lord Mansfield's effort was to get rid of a feudal rule which defeated the settlor's intention. Jessel was a full century farther away from the feudal system than Lord Mansfield, and he was only supplying by judicial decision the defect which existed in the Contingent Re mainders Act of 1845, and which prospectively had already been remedied by the Act of 1877. Furthermore, Lord Mansfield tried to break in upon a rule which had a continuous history of mathematical application since 1324, and of which it could only be said that it was illogical and without reason since the allowance of con tingent remainders in 1430. Jessel, on the other hand, did no more than incline toward the rule which might and logically should have prevailed in conveyances to uses and devises under the Statutes of Uses and Wills, espe cially after it became well settled law that springing and shifting uses and executory de vises were indestructible, but might be invalid upon the ground of remoteness."

The author then explains the effect of the decisions subsequent to and sustaining Letchmere v. Lloyd, and concludes as follows: "It is submitted, then, that in any American jurisdiction, even though its land laws may be founded upon those of England, and though there may be no Contingent Remainders Act in force, yet, if neither actual decision nor the practice of conveyancers has settled the law to the contrary, it may fairly be contended that there is practically no such future interest as a contingent remainder, that is, there is no rule of law which says that a springing future in terest after a particular estate of freehold which may be turned into a vested remainder, or take effect in possession eo instcmti upon the termination of the particular estate, must fail entirely unless it does so. This position, it is believed, finds its chief support upon authority in the recent line of English cases beginning with Lechmere v. Lloyd and ending withBattie-Wrightson v. Thomas. It would be in teresting for us on this side of the Atlantic to know whether English lawyers, in spite of the fact that they might not be, would regard us as justified in this deduction." PROPERTY (Trade Secrets) A COLLECTION of authorities on the law re lating to "Trade Secrets" by Bernard C. Steiner is published in the May Yale Law Journal (V. xiv, p. 374). TORTS (Illegality as Defense) "The Plaintiff's Illegal Act as a Defense in Actions of Tort" is discussed by Harold S. Davis in the May Harvard Law Review (V. xviii, p. 505). "It is conceded by all that if the un lawful act was the cause, or a concurring cause, of the damage, the action is barred and not otherwise. The whole controversy is as to what acts are to be considered causes and what mere conditions." Though the author admits that the tendency is to reduce the de fense almost to a nullity, he approves most of the Massachusetts cases giving it a wider scope. He submits that the distinction between im mediate active cause and a cause for which lia bility is imposed is here important; thus in negligence "the only question is whether the defendant's negligent act was a part of the chain of causation and not unreasonably re