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 EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT should prevail over the prior equity of the cestui que trust." BANKRUPTCY (Ancillary Receivers)

THE conflict of decisions in the different District Courts on "Ancillary Receiverships in Bankruptcy" is discussed by Lee Max Friedman in the May Harvard Law Review (V. xviii, p. 519). The practice of filing sep arate bankruptcy petitions in all jurisdictions where there are assets on the analogy of the practice in railroad receiverships is suggested, but it is admitted that the Act and the "gen eral orders" contemplate proceedings in but a single jurisdiction. "The receiver is regarded as the mere tem porary custodian, chosen to take and retain possession of the visible property liable to wasted and to deliver it to the trustee. He is not invested with title, either by express statute or by general equity principles. It follows, therefore, that where the exigencies of the case require the receiver to travel be yond the jurisdiction of the appointing court, he comes into each foreign jurisdiction neither with authority to take the assets located therein, nor with power to ask the court to recognize, confirm, or extend his original ap pointment as of right. At most, his is merely the privilege of asking recognition on grounds of comity. It is within the discretion of the court to refuse such recognition, to append conditions, to insist on the appointment of a co-ancillary receiver, or to appoint a different person altogether. If he is appointed, he be comes an officer of the subsidiary court, and completely amenable to its control. His power and rights to the assets within its juris diction are derived from its decrees, and do not depend upon the decrees of the court of original jurisdiction extended or recognized on grounds of comity. There exist two distinct legal persons. The ancillary receiver owes obedience within the new jurisdiction only to the court that appoints him, and is to follow its directions irrespective of the orders of the court of original jurisdiction issued to him in his capacity of original receiver."

Assets of Bankrupt Partnerships and Part ners," by William J. Schroder, appears in the May Harvard Laiv Review (V. xviii, p. 495)This statutory method perpetuates the Eng lish common law, which has been admitted to have been adopted only as a rule of con venience without logical basis, namely, that the firm creditors can go against the individual estates only after individual debts are satisfied. The author submits that where the entity theory of partnership prevails, the English decisions are of no authority. He contends that the various provisions of the act relat ing to bankruptcy of partnerships recognize this view. "This view is new only in the frankness of its expression in our system of jurispru dence. It is the common-sense view, the mercantile view, and the juridical view in the Roman, Continental, and Scotch systems. It is the view which has been gaining followers in the United States, and recognition by the legislatures and the courts. Inasmuch as bankruptcy legislation usually declares the existent substantive law, the Act of 1898 has, even by its partial recognition of the 'entity' view, performed a valuable service in calling attention to the fact that the courts have already done the legislating, and that ' to admit the fact is all that remains for them to do.' That the recognized method of dis tribution of partnership and individual assets finds no support in principle, even under the common law view, renders doubly unfortunate the failure of the Act to apply the principles necessarily inherent in its view of the nature of a partnership." Upon the entity view the liability of the individual estate is like that of a surety, and proof against both estates should be allowed. The equity of marshaling, and the lien of a partner to compel the application of the firm assets to the payment of the partnership debts, would prevent any injustice in the ap plication of this view. The Bankruptcy Act in its present form confuses the two views of the nature of partnership and perpetuates the error of the early English decisions.

BANKRUPTCY (Partnership Assets, Distribution)

A CRITICISM of the provisions of the Bank ruptcy Law relating to the "Distribution of

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (See Trusts)