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THE GREEN BAG

show a white light and then a red one. He went towards her and found it was the Crane, which sank after her dead and wounded had been removed. It further appeared that two of the Rus sian ships, the Aurora and the Dmitri Donskoi, which were supposed to be fifteen miles in advance of the flag-ship, were injured by the fire. There was no evidence of damage to the Russian ships by torpedoes or of any tor pedoes having been fired or seen. Official assurances were received by Great Britain from France, Germany, Denmark, Holland, Sweden, and Norway and Japan that no war vessels of any kind belonging to these countries were in the neighborhood of Dogger Bank on the night in question. These notes also generally denied any knowledge of Japanese torpedo-boats hav ing been fitted out or equipped at the ports of the said countries. The reports of the British officials showed that there was no British torpedo-boat in the North Sea on that night and that no torpedo-boat of any description had set out from any British port for the scene of the occurrence. Copies of these reports and assurances were an nexed to the British "Case" and submitted to the Commission. It may be well to observe, at this point, that since Japanese torpedo-boats could not have reached the North Sea without supplies of food, coal, and water and since to supply same would, under the circumstances, have amounted to a breach of its obligations by any other Power, the Russian contention that there were Japanese torpedo-boats present amounts, in effect, to a charge that some unascertained third power had been guilty of a -violation of neutrality. On October 27, 1904, Count Lamsdorff stated to Sir Charles Hardinge that the Russian Government had positive proof that 20 Japanese officers had landed at Hull a few days before the incident and that attacks of the kind had been planned by the Japanese. The official correspondence

with reference to the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry shows that the British representatives regarded Russia's defense as impugning Great Britain's observ ance of neutrality. 2. As to the duration of the firing, the Russian witnesses testified that the presence of the trawlers was discovered about the time the firing began and that they were pointed out by appropriate signal, with the command not to fire on them; but that their presence in the firing-zone rendered it unavoidable that they should be struck by the Russian projectiles aimed at the torpedo-boats. The British fishermen stated that, notwithstanding the signals sent up from the boat of the Admiral of the fishing fleet and the display of lights by the other trawlers, the firing was continued for a period estimated by them at from 15 to 30 minutes. Captain Klado (Russian) stated that it lasted exactly 9 minutes. The Skipper of the Mino stated that his engineer had timed it and it lasted more than 20 minutes. 3. As to the alleged negligence of the fishermen, no fault was shown on the part of the fishermen, beyond the testimony of the Russian witnesses that they failed to show their regulation signals. William Smith, mate of the Crane (the boat which was sunk by the Russian fire) testified that she had her regulation lights burning and her sail set; that the search-lights of the men-of-war were turned on all the time the firing continued; that the lights of the Crane were shot away. Two men aboard her were killed and all the others wounded but one. 4. As to Admiral Rojdestvensky's failure to halt his ships and render aid to the fisher men or ascertain the extent of their injuries, Admiral Rojdestvensky's defense was that' he saw, or thought he saw, hostile torpedoboats engaged in an attack on his squadron. With the responsibility of such a command, few thinking men would contend that he was under the obligation to jeopardize his entire command for the reason, largely senti