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THE GREEN BAG

is that there was no marriage. Plaintiff (the husband under the belief that they were legally wife) had been married prior to her marriage married. On this state of facts the Court of with defendant and had been abandoned by her Errors and Appeals held that the relations of husband, who had been absent some three years Voorhees with the woman with whom the second at the time of the latter marriage. This mar marriage ceremony was performed were not riage was entered into by both parties under matrimonial at the start, and that they continued the belief that plaintiff's former husband was to be meretricious after Voorhees' wife had ob dead, and the parties thereafter cohabited as tained a divorce. man and wife. Some time after this marriage, This case is rather strongly, and apparently "in order to make assurance doubly sure," plain justly, criticised by Stevenson, V. C., in the case tiff obtained a divorce from her first husband under consideration, and it is suggested that the and the marital cohabitation was continued as husband in that case should have been held to before, defendant at all times introducing plain be estopped to question the validity of the second tiff as his wife, and living with her as such for a marriage. period of over twenty years. After the com The Chamberlain case, however, presents facts mencement of plaintiff's proceedings for divorce which are somewhat stronger in favor of the it was discovered for the first time that plaintiff's application of the doctrine of estoppel than were first husband was still living, so that the marriage those involved in the Voorhees case. In the between plaintiff and defendant was, at the time present case it will be remembered both parties it was celebrated, wholly void. In considering to the ceremony believed that it was legal, and the question whether a legal marriage actually that both were competent to enter into the existed between plaintiff and defendant, and if marriage relation, and that after all impediments not, whether defendant was entitled to avail to a legal marriage had been removed, they con himself of that fact, the court makes a clear and tinued to act upon this assumption. There was logical division of the adjudicated cases into evidence in the present case that defendant had three classes. persuaded plaintiff that no further marriage was The case of Campbell v. Campbell, L. R. i H. L. necessary after she obtained the divorce from sec. 182, commonly referred to as the "Breadal- her former husband, and that she had acted upon bane Case," is selected as typical of one of these his statements in this regard. Under all the classes. In that case a man eloped with a mar facts it is held that defendant should be regarded ried woman. Subsequently the woman's husband as estopped to question the validity of the mar died and this man and woman continued to riage. The decision is not, however, rested cohabit as they had formerly done, holding entirely upon this ground, but it is further held themselves out to the world as they began to do that a marriage actually existed between the at the time when they first lived together in parties, dating from the time plaintiff obtained adultery as husband and wife. Under these her divorce, so that a lawful marriage might circumstances the House of Lords decided that exist between them. a marriage existed between these people at the time when they first became capable of entering into such relation. MARRIAGE BROKAGE CONTRACT. As typical of the second class the case of Col SUPREME COURT OF IOWA. lins v. Voorhees. 46 N. J. Eq. 411, 19 Atl. 172, So-called marriage brokage contracts have for is referred to. This case repudiates the doctrine many years been held invalid as contrary to of the Breadalbane case, although the facts are public policy, a large number of cases containing somewhat dissimilar. In this case one Voorhees such holdings being collected in the Century obtained a fraudulent and void divorce in Con Edition of the American Digest, under the title necticut from his wife, who resided in New Jersey, "Contracts" in vol. ii, sec. 516. The Supreme knowing at the time that the suit and decree Court of Iowa, however, in the case of In re were a fraud on his wife and on the court. Ex Grobes' Estate, 102 Northwestern Reporter. 804. hibiting this decree to a woman in Massachu takes a position a little in advance of the majority setts she was publicly married to him under the of cases. In the Iowa case it was alleged that belief that he was lawfully divorced. Sometime the claimant made a contract with deceased, after this marriage Voorhees' wife heard of the whereby the latter agreed to pay to the former fraudulent divorce obtained in Connecticut, a certain sum, if she would go to Chicago and appeared in that cause, had the decree opened, • see a woman whom he was desirous of marrying, filed a cross-bill and obtained a decree of divorce. and give her information concerning him, and The second wife had no knowledge of this pro that claimant carried out the contract. All of ceeding and continued to live with her supposed the cases hold that no recovery can be had under