Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 17.pdf/34

 THE MAINTENANCE OF THE OPEN SHOP IV In the ruling case in England to-day, Quinn v. Leatham (1902) A. C. 495, we have one of the best examples of the sort of pressure which it must be obvious that a trades union should be forbidden to use, even to advance its own interests. The plaintiff in that case was a butcher engaged in business near Belfast. His employees organized a union to which they refused to admit one Dickie, a foreman; they later demanded of the plaintiff that he dismiss Dickie. Upon the plaintiff's refusal to do this, the defendants representing the union went to one Munce who bought meat of the plaintiff and warned him that unless he stopped buying while the trouble was on, his own men would be called out next. Munce at last yielded to this coercion and notified plaintiff to send no more meat until he settled with his men. This was the cause of action for which damages to the trade were claimed. The House of Lords, notwithstanding the contrary tendencies of Allen v. Flood (1898) A. C. i, held for the plaintiff upon this showing. The squarest opinion in this case is that of Lord Lindley who handles the question with characteristic method: "As to the plaintiff's rights. He had the ordinary rights of a British subject. He was at liberty to earn his own living in his own way, provided he did not violate some special law prohibiting him from so doing, and provided he did not infringe the rights of other people. This liberty involved liberty to deal with other persons who were willing to deal with him. This liberty is a right recognized by law; its correlative is the general duty of every one not to pre vent the free exercise of this liberty, except so far as his own liberty of action may justify him in so doing. But a person's liberty or right to deal with others is nu gatory, unless they are at liberty to deal with him if they choose to do so. Any interference with their liberty to deal with

him affects him. If such interference is justifiable in point of law, he has no redress. Again, if such interference is wrongful, the only person who can sue in respect of it is, as a rule, the person immediately affected by it; another who suffers by it has usually no redress; the damage to him is too remote and it would be obviously practically im possible and highly inconvenient to give legal redress to all who suffered from such wrongs. But if the interference is wrong ful and is intended to damage a third person, and he is damaged in fact — in other words, if he is wrongfully and intentionally struck at through others, and is thereby damnified —the whole aspect of the case is changed: the wrong done to others reaches him his rights are infringed although indirectly, and damage to him is not remote or unfore seen, but is the direct consequence of what has been done. Our law, as I understand it, is not so defective as to refuse him a remedy by an action under such circum stances." The ultimate motive, even in a case so outrageous as this, is to advance the interests of the trades union by strengthening its organization. But the court would not admit this circumstance as a justification for what was proved to have been done. And indeed, if a trades union were permitted by law to use the force of their organization to overpower opposition in this way there hardly would be any sort of boycott which could not be so excused. Upon boycott fortunately, the law is all one way; that is regarded as too serious a breach of the industrial peace to be permitted for any purpose. One man may refuse to deal with another man perhaps; but it does not fol low that a body of men may concentrate their forces upon a single man. At that point the law steps in, as indeed it must; for all experience shows that one man is helpless against an organization. It does not alter this conclusion to plead that the union simply refuses to deal or threatens to refuse to deal, and that it only asks of