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 THE APPLICABILITY OF ENGLISH METHODS

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MARYLAND The complaint of the law's delay is no new one. Shakespeare comments on it, and history affords instances of it of far earlier date. The subject is one which naturally separates itself into two divisions, that which has to do with appellate bodies, and that which concerns the courts of first instance. As regards the first of these, the reason for delay is not everywhere the same, there fore no one universal cause can be assigned which is everywhere operative. But there are three reasons, one of which is almost always present, and the statement of them will in part if not wholly suggest the nature of the remedy required. When the judges of Appellate Courts are likewise required to do circuit work, as is frequently the case, it must often result that one branch or the other of their work will be deferred as less pressing, and that is naturally the appel late work. Of the whole number of cases tried in any jurisdiction, by far the larger part never go beyond the court of first instance, and many a judge will feel that the duty on him is more imperative to accord one trial to as large a number of causes as possible, than to delay the many in order that the few may have another trial or a second opportunity. Wherever this ground exists it is easily obviated by relieving appellate judges from the per formance of local or circuit work. A second cause of delay in Appellate Courts is the manner in which the dockets are made up. Most courts of this char acter have but a small number of terms a vear, the docket is made up to the beginning of the term, and then the gate is abruptly shut. A record comes up on the day fol lowing, delayed possibly in the transmission, and that must then find a place on the docket of the ensuing term, distant any where from three months to a year, and the fabled laws of the Medes and Persians were not less rigid than are the rules which

govern the make-up and closing of the docket of the term of court. A little more elasticity right at this point would accom plish much. A third reason, more debatable than the other two, is whether we are not too gen erous under our statutes in the allowance of appeals. Will any one who has closely watched the courts of last resort question the proposition that many appeals are taken only for the purpose of delay? Do not the "unreported cases" listed in the volumes of the various state reports bear strong evidence of this fact? Why are they un reported? Can it be for any reason save that there was no principle involved which had not been already settled by previous adjudications? And if so, that fact should have been known to and recognized by the attorney taking the appeal. Do we not hear every short while of an unsuccessful litigant saying, "Oh! it will not be very expensive to take this case up, there is a chance that I may win out, and if I do not, the additional time I shall gain before the day of final reckoning will be worth more to me than the cost of the appeal." Ought such appeals to be possible? When the parties have had one fair trial before a competent judge and jury, have they not had all they are entitled to except in rare instances? The difficult question is, If appeals are to be more strictly limited, along what lines shall the limitation be made, or who is to determine whether such appeal shall be allowed? A number of answers are possible, none entirely free from objection. But this only shows that the solution is difficult. It does not show that it is im possible. When we turn to the "law's delays," in courts of first instance, the difficulty will be found to be confined for the most part to the larger cities. It results in no small degree from the fact that in this country we have assumed that, in order to preserve